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WHAT CAN THE FEDS AND THE FRENCH TEACH 
US ABOUT CRIMINAL RESTITUTION IN MAINE? 
Benjamin M. Birney* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On New Year’s Eve 1981, seventeen year old Kevin Tunell, returning home 
from a party at which he had consumed a large amount of champagne, struck and 
killed eighteen year old Susan Herzog.1  In 1982, Tunell pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter and was sentenced to lecture to teens on the dangers of drunk driving 
for one year.2  Herzog’s family, outraged at what they perceived to be the leniency 
of the sentence, brought a civil action against Tunell, obtaining a $100,000 
settlement from his insurance company.3  In addition, Tunell agreed to send one 
dollar to Herzog’s family every week for eighteen years.4  Despite Tunell’s efforts 
to dissuade teens from driving drunk, the death of Susan Herzog led the family to 
grow to hate Tunell.5  Tunell, for his part, repeatedly failed to send the dollar, 
eventually earning a jail sentence for contempt of court.6  Herzog’s family 
members insisted that their main interest in the weekly dollar was to punish Tunell, 
and that his failure to send the dollars represented to them his forgetfulness of the 
crime.7  Susan Herzog’s father stated that “every time we don’t get a check, there’s 
only one thing that comes to our mind:  [Tunell] doesn’t remember.”8 
This troubled victim-offender relationship neatly illustrates several tensions in 
the law of restitution and victims’ rights.  Although Tunell’s single-dollar 
obligation was not the result of criminal restitution but rather of a civil settlement, 
it bears many of the characteristics of restitution as used in the criminal law:  Its 
purpose is in part to punish and in part to rehabilitate the offender, as well as to 
compensate the victim.9  The relationship between the victims of a crime and the 
offender is complex and deeply personal.  The offender often has trouble paying 
the restitution.  And finally, the victims, in order to obtain what they see as justice 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Maine School of Law.  I am grateful to Professors Melvyn 
Zarr and Martin Rogoff for their guidance in researching this comment and to the many law students, 
judges, and practitioners who were kind enough to provide their opinions on Maine’s restitution law. 
 1. Peter Carlson & Josh Hammer, Outrage over Drunk Driving, PEOPLE.COM (July 25, 1983), 
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20085540,00.html. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Bill Hewitt & Tom Nugent, Kevin Tunell Is Paying $1 a Week for a Death He Caused and 
Finding the Price Unexpectedly High, PEOPLE.COM (Apr. 16, 2000), 
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20117385,00.html. Tunell did spend a great deal of 
time lecturing to young people on the dangers of drunk driving.  Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. See JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES’S BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF LAW 194 
(1985). 
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from the offender in the form of restitution, have only limited tools to press their 
claims in the justice system. 
This Comment argues that Maine could improve the outcome of its criminal 
justice system with respect to crime victims by giving victims greater procedural 
and substantive rights to restitution.  Obviously, this position assumes that making 
the victim whole is a desirable outcome of criminal justice, so this Comment begins 
by placing victims’ interests in the context of Maine’s criminal law.10  The 
Comment then suggests that Maine could improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of its criminal justice system by creating a mechanism by which sentencing courts 
would be guided, in part by victims themselves, to use more restitution and less 
prison time.  The mechanism to accomplish this rebalancing includes a refinement 
of this journal’s 1974 proposal that Maine adopt some limited elements of victim 
self-advocacy from the French partie civile system.  The proposed mechanism 
would also create stronger incentives for offenders to pay their restitution than exist 
currently, and would offer offenders practical support in meeting their obligations.  
This Comment draws on statutory restitution and victims’ rights law from several 
sources outside Maine—primarily U.S. federal criminal law and French criminal 
law. 
Part II examines the purpose of restitution in the context of civil and criminal 
law, particularly as enunciated in the Maine Criminal Code.  Part III compares 
Maine crime victims’ procedural and substantive rights with the rights afforded by 
France and by the U.S. Congress.  Part IV identifies specific areas where Maine 
could improve its current system.  Part V suggests statutory reforms that enhance 
both victims’ rights and the use of restitution.  These proposed reforms also 
enhance offenders’ incentives to pay restitution and provide new support 
mechanisms to help them meet their obligations. 
II.  THE PURPOSE OF RESTITUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW 
In general, criminal law focuses on punishing an offender and protecting 
society, while civil law focuses on protecting and making whole an injured party.  
However, neither domain is mutually exclusive.  In limited cases, civil remedies 
also serve to punish particularly culpable civil defendants.  And, in the case of 
restitution, the criminal law also attempts to make the crime victim whole for his 
loss.11 
                                                                                                     
 10. “Despite the venerable heritage of restitution and its widespread use today,” see infra note 11, 
“the idea that compensating the victim complements punishing the criminal is vulnerable to theoretical 
challenge.”  Benjamin M. Birney, Restitution is old.  Is it just?, BENJAMIN BIRNEY (Aug. 25, 2012), 
http://www.bbirney.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Restitution-is-old.-Is-it-just.pdf.  This comment 
proceeds, in accordance with the great weight of state and federal statutory and case law, as though 
criminal restitution were both desirable and consistent with due process of law.  I have briefly discussed 
several arguments against restitution elsewhere, see generally id., and I look forward to considering the 
theoretical justifications for criminal restitution in more depth in a later article. 
 11. The laws of the ancient Hebrews are early examples of restitution in human law.  See, e.g., 
Exodus 21:18-19 (battery); Exodus 21:33-36, 22:14-15 (injury and death to domestic animals); Exodus 
22:3 (theft); Exodus 22:5-6 (damage to real property and crops); Exodus 22:7-13 (loss of property by a 
negligent bailee).  Theologian Gary DeMar argues that restitution as a criminal punishment “remind[s] 
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Legal practitioners have traditionally understood criminal sanctions to serve 
any of four, sometimes conflicting, purposes:  (1) deterring the offender and others 
like him, (2) protecting the public by restraining the offender, (3) rehabilitating the 
offender, and (4) punishing the offender.12  Maine has announced similar goals in 
its criminal statutes.13  Most penology through the 1960s focused on deterrence and 
rehabilitation as the dominant goals of criminal law.14  However, since then, courts 
and commentators have focused more heavily on punishing the defendant simply 
because his actions were wrongful.15  For instance, Judge Kermit V. Lipez, at the 
time a justice in the Maine Superior Court,16 noted that a prison sentence “advances 
the goal of punishment . . . [not] in the service of some other sentencing goal, such 
as deterrence . . . [but] in its pure sense, the subject addressed delicately by the 
criminal code when it [instructs] judges to impose sentences ‘which do not 
diminish the gravity of offenses.’”17  In Maine, a sentencing judge must craft a 
sentence that attempts both to individualize punishment to the defendant, based on 
the facts of his crime and of his background, and also to punish similar crimes with 
similar sentences.18 
Civil remedies, by contrast, generally focus on the rights of the plaintiff.  In 
most cases, a civil judgment uses compensatory damages to make the plaintiff 
whole for any injury that he suffered to his person or property.19  Less frequently, 
courts may issue an injunction to compel the defendant to future action or 
                                                                                                     
the criminal that he is ultimately responsible to God for his actions, and his victims, created in God’s 
image, must be compensated in the manner prescribed by the Judge of all the earth.”  Gary DeMar, The 
Biblical Doctrine of Restitution, AM. VISION (May 12, 2010), http://americanvision.org/2480/the-
biblical-doctrine-of-restitution/ (internal quotations omitted).  In other words, restitution is justified, not 
because the crime is an offense against an individual or against society, but because it is an offense 
against God, who has prescribed restitution as the correct remedy. 
  Many other ancient legal codes included restitution as well.  See generally Christopher Bright, 
Restitution, RESTORATIVE JUST. ONLINE (1997), http://www.restorativejustice.org/university-
classroom/01introduction/tutorial-introduction-to-restorative-justice/outcomes/restitution/. 
 12. WHITE, supra note 9, at 194.  See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Proposed Official Draft 
1962) (identifying similar goals). 
 13. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151(1), (8) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (“The general purposes [of Maine’s 
criminal sentencing provisions] are . . . [t]o prevent crime through the deterrent effect of sentences, the 
rehabilitation of convicted persons, and the restraint of convicted persons . . . [and] [t]o permit sentences 
that do not diminish the gravity of offenses . . . .”). 
 14. Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 
943, 978 (1999). 
 15. Id. at 979.  See also C.S. LEWIS, GOD IN THE DOCK: ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND ETHICS 287-89 
(Walter Hooper, ed., 1970) (arguing that deterrence and rehabilitation, as goals of the criminal justice 
system, deprive each person of human rights). 
 16. Kermit V. Lipez, Sentencing Without Resources A Challenge To Intellectual Honesty, 8 ME. 
B.J. 182, 182 (1993).  
 17. Id. at 183 (quoting § 1151(8)).  See also id. (“[Criminal punishment] is a civilized version of the 
cry for vengeance. . . . Although these legitimate expectations of the victim must not control my 
sentencing decision, they should influence it.”).  See also id. at 183-84 (expressing doubts as to the 
“intellectual honesty” of deterrence and rehabilitation as goals). 
 18. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 10, 745 A.2d 368. 
 19. See Estate of Hoch v. Stifel, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 41, 16 A.3d 137; see also Wendward Corp. v. 
Group Design, Inc., 428 A.2d 57, 62 (Me. 1981) (“That measure [of calculating damages] which most 
precisely compensates a plaintiff for its loss . . . should be applied.”). 
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forbearance that will prevent harm to the plaintiff.20  However, although the overall 
focus of the civil judgment is to prevent or repair harm to the injured party, 
“punitive” money damages can also serve to punish particularly malicious civil 
defendants.21  In this sense, punitive damages have an overlapping purpose with the 
purposes of the criminal law.  For instance, Maine uses punitive damages to 
supplement the deterrent effects of the criminal law when criminal sanction 
“cannot . . . adequately fulfill its role as an enforcer of society’s rules”22  This is so 
even though the state relies on a private plaintiff to request such punitive damages 
as part of his or her civil remedy.23 
Likewise, restitution can be used by a criminal sentencing court to compensate 
a victim for his injury.24  Various jurisdictions and commentators describe 
restitution as either serving primarily to rehabilitate the offender, or else primarily 
to compensate the victim.25  Although these goals are usually complementary, the 
jurisdiction’s focus is important because it gives direction to a sentencing court 
seeking to apply restitution as part of a criminal sentence.26  This is so because, in 
imposing any criminal sentence, a sentencing judge considers the purpose of 
criminal sanction.  A judge faced with an offender and with a victim who has 
suffered economic damages must weigh these purposes.  If the jurisdiction is more 
offender-focused, the judge might ask:  Does the offender’s crime and individual 
characteristics make restitution an effective method of deterrence, punishment, and 
rehabilitation?  On the other hand, if the jurisdiction is more victim-focused, the 
judge might ask instead:  Are this victim’s economic damages such that ordering 
restitution would effectively make the victim whole?  In reality, of course, a judge 
will ask both questions; the difference will lie in the weight to which he gives each 
answer.  In the aggregate, the jurisdiction’s focus will inform whether the justice 
system as a whole leans toward punishing more heavily with restitution or with 
imprisonment. 
                                                                                                     
 20. 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 11 (2011). 
 21. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1358 (Me. 1985). 
 22. Id. (internal citations omitted). See also id. at 1363 (“[T]he primary concern of the doctrine of 
punitive damages is to deter misconduct, not to benefit plaintiffs.”).  In Maine, a civil plaintiff must 
prove by “clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with malice” to be awarded punitive 
damages.  Id. 
 23. Id. at 1358 (“The potential for recovering an exemplary award provides an incentive for private 
civil enforcement of society’s rules against serious misconduct.”) (footnote omitted).  A plaintiff 
naturally has plenty of economic incentive to request punitive damages, since they constitute a 
“windfall,” compensating him for more than the amount of his actual damages.  Id. 
 24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 25. Compare id. (the goal of restitution is to “help the defendant to lead a law-abiding life”) with An 
Act to provide additional protections and assistance to victims and witnesses in Federal cases, Victim 
and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–291, 96 Stat 1248§ 2(b)(2),  (1982) (later codified 
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (2000 & Supp. 2012))  (“The Congress declares that the purposes of this act 
[include] . . . to ensure that the Federal Government does all that is possible within limits of available 
resources to assist victims and witnesses of crime . . . .”). 
 26. Compare State v. Guilliams, 90 P.3d 785, 789 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (“The purpose of the 
restitution statutes is to make victims whole.”) with Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 
F.3d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Restitution as part of a defendant’s sentence serves the traditional penal 
functions of punishment, including rehabilitation.”). 
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A.  The Purpose of Restitution in Maine’s Criminal Law 
Maine identifies restitution as a distinct, independent purpose of criminal 
sentencing,27 focusing partly on the victim but primarily on the offender.28  With 
respect to the offender, Maine intends restitution to serve a rehabilitative purpose.29  
Maine’s criminal statute anticipates that restitution can rehabilitate by 
“reinforc[ing] the offender’s sense of responsibility for the offense . . . [and] 
provid[ing] him the opportunity to pay his debt to society and to his victim . . . .”30   
However, restitution also serves to “ease the burden of the victim as a result of the 
criminal conduct.”31  Nonetheless, the statute makes clear that restitution’s benefit 
to the victim is secondary, at least from a sentencing perspective, to the punishment 
inflicted on the offender.32  Consistent with that perspective, the sentencing judge is 
required to consider restitution at sentencing, but is not under any circumstances 
required to order it.33  The judge may not, for instance, impose restitution if it 
would impose an “excessive financial hardship” on the offender—or his 
dependents.34  This criterion illustrates the statute’s focus on the offender; the judge 
must consider the victim’s financial hardship, but it is the offender’s hardship that 
is dispositive.35 
Consistent with this focus on the offender, Maine’s provisions for victims’ 
                                                                                                     
 27. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151(2) (2006 & Supp. 2011).  
 28. One gives the Maine Legislature the benefit of the doubt in this interpretation.  One might also 
conclude that the Legislature struggled to select from among fundamentally conflicting purposes in 
formulating the statute.  Compare 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1321 (2006) (“The Legislature finds and declares 
that the victims of crimes often suffer losses through no fault of their own and for which there is no 
compensation. . . . It is the purpose of [restitution] to encourage compensation of victims by . . . the 
offender . . . .”)  with id. (“[R]epayment . . . by the offender to the victim . . . can operate to rehabilitate 
the offender in certain instances. . . . The Legislature recognizes that crime is an offense against society 
as a whole, not only against the victim of the crime, and that restitution  for victims is therefore ancillary 
to the central objectives of the criminal law.”).  But see id. § 1151(2) (identifying restitution as the one 
of eight “general purposes” of criminal sentencing, equal with deterrence, rehabilitation, and restraint).  
Regardless, the Legislature’s express intent in the statute seems to embrace both making the victim 
whole and punishing the offender. 
 29. Id. § 1321. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. (“[The Legislature] intends restitution to be applied only when other purposes of 
sentencing can be appropriately served.”). 
 33. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1323 (2006).  Compared to the Federal restitution statute and the partie civile 
system used in France, Maine’s restitution statute leaves a very large amount of discretion in the hands 
of the judge as to whether restitution shall be ordered. See infra note 67. 
 34. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1325(D) (2006). 
 35. Unlike § 1325, the Legislature’s directions to sentencing judges for calculating a term of 
imprisonment are notably silent on the issue of financial hardship on the offender.  See 17-A M.R.S.A § 
1252-C (2006 & Supp. 2011).  The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court, has 
interpreted § 1252-C to permit the sentencing judge to consider restitution among the aggravating and 
mitigating factors used to personalize a sentence of imprisonment to the offender.  State v. Reese, 2010 
ME 30, ¶ 19, 991 A.2d 806.  Thus, the judge may consider the offender’s financial hardship in deciding 
whether or not to impose restitution, and may consider any restitution paid in deciding how long to 
imprison the offender.  This situation presents the danger of deep-pocketed offenders buying down their 
prison time, notwithstanding the Legislature’s admonition against such a result.  17-A M.R.S.A. § 1321. 
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rights are silent on the issue of restitution.  A crime victim must be notified of the 
various procedural stages of the trial;36 must be permitted to address the court at 
sentencing;37 must be notified of the offender’s release;38 and is assured that 
information relating to his current address or location is kept confidential.39 
However, the statute creates no individual right to restitution.40  Furthermore, as 
noted above, not only is the court under no obligation to actually order restitution, 
it is positively instructed to consider the financial hardship on the offender when 
making this decision.41   
Under Maine law, victims of certain crimes do have a right to limited 
compensation from the Victims’ Compensation Board.42  However, save for a 
small mandatory assessment to benefit the Victims’ Compensation Fund,43 the 
procedure for victims’ compensation is disconnected from the criminal proceeding.  
This disconnect further highlights the offender-focused nature of Maine’s 
restitution provisions. 
Despite this focus on the offender, Maine’s restitution scheme is in some ways 
similar to civil compensatory damages.  For instance, the amount of restitution is 
measured against the amount of the victim’s economic loss.44  The burden of proof 
is also similar; a sentencing judge only needs to find the amount of the victim’s 
damages by a preponderance of the evidence.45  Because a crime victim must be 
allowed to address the court at sentencing if he wishes to do so,46 he has at least a 
rough analog to his opportunity in a civil proceeding to present evidence of his 
damages.47  To the casual observer, a sentencing hearing at which a victim requests 
                                                                                                     
 36. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1172 (2006). 
 37. Id. § 1174 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 38. Id. § 1175. 
 39. Id. § 1176. 
 40. During his address at sentencing, a well-informed victim could, on his own initiative, ask the 
court to consider his economic damages and award restitution.  See id. § 1174 (2006).  However, victims 
must be educated about this opportunity in order to use it, and may need assistance in compiling 
evidence of their damages.  Maine only “encourage[s] [counties] to establish a victim . . . support 
program to assist the victims of criminal offenses.”  30-A M.R.S.A. § 460 (2011).  All sixteen Maine 
counties have established Victim/Witness Advocates.  List of VWAs in Maine, ME. VICTIM WITNESS 
ADVOCATES (Jun. 13, 2007), http://mainevwa.org/List_Of_VWAs.htm. The Maine Attorney General’s 
office also has two Victim Witness Advocates who offer some support to the families of homicide 
victims.  See Homicides, OFF. OF THE ME. ATT’Y GEN. (2011), 
http://www.maine.gov/ag/crime/crimes_we_prosecute/homicides.shtml. The frank language of the 
relevant topical subtitle within the Frequently Asked Questions section in the Attorney General’s page 
on homicides illustrates the underlying problem, however:  “A member of my family was murdered. 
The system is confusing, and I am overwhelmed.”  Id. 
 41. 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1323, 1325 (2006). 
 42. 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 3360-B, 3360-E (2002 & Pamph. 2011). 
 43. Id. § 3360-I (2002). 
 44. State v. McCray, 1999 ME 151, ¶ 7, 740 A.2d 38. 
 45. State v. Berube, 1997 ME 165, ¶ 19, 698 A.2d 509. 
 46. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1174 (2006). 
 47. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 2001 WL 34128258, at *1-2 (Me. Super. July 16, 2001) (denying 
post-conviction review sought on the grounds that the sentencing judge had taken a victim impact letter 
describing economic loss into account in determining the sentence; defendant had the opportunity to 
rebut the statements in the letter but failed to do so). 
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restitution would appear similar to a civil bench trial, with the prosecutor standing 
in for plaintiff’s counsel.  
In sum, Maine’s restitution scheme combines some elements of civil 
compensatory damages with a primary purpose, now increasingly disfavored,48 of 
rehabilitating the offender.  Comparison with the federal restitution statute will 
provide a context for the statutory improvements that this Comment suggests. 
B.  The Purpose of Restitution in Federal Criminal Law 
Restitution under federal law is significantly more focused on the victim.49  
Federal law, like Maine law, requires a sentencing judge to consider restitution at 
every sentence,50 but also makes restitution mandatory51 for most violent crimes, 
offenses related to tampering with consumer products, and “offense[s] against 
property.”52  The mandatory restitution statute requires that the offender be ordered 
to compensate the victim for any economic personal or property damage that the 
victim suffers as a result of the crime.53 
The legislative history behind 18 U.S.C. § 3663A reveals a much greater 
interest in the rights of the victim than does Maine’s restitution statute.  With 
regard to the Victim Restitution Act of 1995, codified at § 3663A,54 the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary stated that it wished to “ensure that the loss to crime 
victims is recognized, and that they receive the restitution that they are due.”55  The 
Committee described restitution in terms strongly reminiscent of civil 
compensatory damages: 
The principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually every formal system of 
criminal justice, of every culture and every time. It holds that, whatever else the 
sanctioning power of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should also ensure 
that the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or 
her prior state of well-being.56 
Reciting a series of statistics illustrating the economic costs of violent crime in 
the United States, the Committee required that “the criminal justice system 
recognize the impact that crime has on the victim, and, to the extent possible, 
ensure that [the] offender be held accountable to repay these costs.”57 
The federal legislative history also reveals a parallel interest in punishing the 
offender. This interest is more consistent with current thought on criminal sanction 
                                                                                                     
 48. See supra notes 15-17 (discussing the trend away from rehabilitation as a purpose of the 
criminal law). 
 49. See S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 13 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.S.C.A.N. 924, 926, 1995 WL 
731704 (expressing the Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s desire for a more “victim-centered justice 
system.”). 
 50. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (2000 & Supp. 2012). 
 51. Id. § 3663A. 
 52. Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A). 
 53. Id. § 3663A(b). 
 54. Codified at § 3663A. 
 55. S. REP. NO. 104-179, supra note 49, at 12. 
 56. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. at 18. 
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than that expressed by the Maine Legislature.  For instance, the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, responding to concerns from the federal judiciary that most 
offenders are unable to pay restitution, asserted that restitution serves penological 
goals by making the offender more accountable for the harm he caused.58  The 
Committee also wanted to “ensure that the offender realizes the damage caused by 
the offense and pays the debt owed to the victim as well as to society.”59  Notably 
absent from the Committee’s report, and from the statute itself, is any mention of 
rehabilitation as a purpose of restitution.  Eighteen years after Maine’s restitution 
statute was passed, the U.S. Congress had recognized the shift in thinking on the 
purpose of the criminal law—away from rehabilitation, and toward punishment.60 
Notwithstanding its almost apologetic association with the traditional goals of 
criminal punishment, the legislative history of the federal mandatory restitution 
statute reveals an undeniable preference for using restitution as a tool to make 
crime victims whole for their losses. 
III.  RESTITUTION AND VICTIMS’ PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IN MAINE WITH 
COMPARISONS TO OTHER DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 
Compared to the federal restitution and victims’ rights statutes and to the Civil 
Code model exemplified by the French partie civile, Maine’s restitution and 
victims’ rights laws are unfavorable to crime victims.  This situation does not, on 
its own, warrant an adjustment to the law.  After all, criminal law is traditionally 
focused on the criminal and on society at large,61 and a crime victim still has the 
option to bring a civil suit against the offender.62  However, given Maine’s stated63 
and inferable64 public intent to restore and re-empower crime victims, the State is 
well served by adapting to its own needs the most compatible laws of more victim-
favorable jurisdictions.  The substantive and procedural rights available in the U.S. 
federal courts and in French courts illuminate new possibilities for crime victims in 
Maine. 
                                                                                                     
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 12. 
 60. See Kadish, supra note 14, at 978-81. 
 61. See WHITE, supra note 9, at 194-95. 
 62. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1327 (2006).  However, this is not a practical alternative for many crime 
victims because the likelihood of actually recovering a civil judgment from many offenders is quite low.  
See Civil Court Action for Victims and Survivors, AARDVARC.ORG (May 5, 2011), 
http://www.aardvarc.org/victim/civilsuit.shtml (“If the perpetrator has no assets, is not likely to come 
into any assets, and is not insured, then there may be limited prospects for a victim to collect on a 
judgment. Suing for money doesn’t mean the defendant HAS any . . . .”).  Plaintiffs’ lawyers working on 
a contingent fee basis do not have a strong incentive to take cases in which the defendant is judgment-
proof. 
 63. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1321 (2006). 
 64. See 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 3360 to 3360-M (2002 & Pamph. 2011) (establishing a Victims’ 
Compensation Fund); 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1171-1177 (2006 & Supp. 2011) (defining procedural rights 
for crime victims). 
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A.  Restitution and Victims’ Procedural Rights under Maine Law 
In Maine, judges have substantial discretion over when to order restitution and 
in what amount.  Furthermore, what limitations exist on that discretion protect 
offenders, not victims.  A crime victim is entitled only to have the sentencing court 
inquire, “whenever practicable,” into the amount of the victim’s economic loss.65  
This “inquiry” is made of the prosecutor, a law enforcement officer, or the victim 
himself.66  Maine requires that the sentencing court order restitution when it is 
“appropriate”; if restitution is not ordered, the judge shall explain why not.67  In 
determining whether to award restitution, a sentencing court must consider any 
misconduct by the victim during the crime, any delay in reporting the crime, and 
whether the offender is able to pay restitution.68  The judge may not award 
restitution if doing so would “create[] an excessive financial hardship on the 
offender or [a] dependent of the offender.”69  By the plain language of the statute, 
the offender bears no burden as to this “defense”; however, the Law Court has held 
that the offender bears the burden of production as to any excessive financial 
hardship.70 
Crime victims’ other rights in Maine, like their restitution rights, are narrowly 
circumscribed.  The prosecutor must, again “when practicable,” notify the victim of 
the time and place of the sentencing.71  The victim has the right to address the court 
during sentencing, either by making an oral statement in open court or by making a 
written statement to the court.72  The court must “consider” the statements of the 
victim in imposing a sentence, “along with all other appropriate factors.”73  Even 
the Legislature’s inclusion of restitution as an independent goal of sentencing 
expressly limits its application to cases where “other purposes of sentencing can be 
appropriately served.”74  Although Maine maintains a public fund to pay 
compensation to the victims of many crimes,75 the fund payout is limited to a 
maximum of $15,000 of “actual and unreimbursed losses.”76  Furthermore, the 
Victims’ Compensation Board has substantial discretion to limit the award based 
on, among other factors, the amount of money actually available in the fund and 
how many claims are being made.77 
Finally, a crime victim in Maine who believes a sentencing judge erred in not 
awarding restitution, or in determining the amount of the restitution, has no means 
                                                                                                     
 65. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1323(1) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. § 1323(2). 
 68. Id. § 1325(1) (2006). 
 69. Id. § 1325(2)(D). 
 70. State v. Berube, 1997 ME 165, ¶ 19, 698 A.2d 509. 
 71. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1172 (2006). 
 72. Id. § 1174(1) (2006). 
 73. Id. § 1174(2). 
 74. Id. § 1151(2) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 75. 5 M.R.S.A. § 3360-B (2002 & Supp. 2011). 
 76. Id. § 3360-E (2002). 
 77. Id. § 3360-F. 
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by which to appeal the judge’s decision.78  The only recourse available to such a 
victim is the Victims’ Compensation Board.79 
B.  Restitution and Victims’ Procedural Rights under Federal Law 
1.  The Federal Law 
Before a federal district court, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A gives a crime victim 
significantly more rights and opportunities to advocate for himself.80  A federal 
sentencing judge must order restitution for any “crime of violence,” any “offense 
against property,” and most drug crimes.81  The sentencing judge may also, at his 
discretion, apply a sentence of restitution for any crime, provided that some 
evidence of the victim’s economic loss is available.82  For violent crimes, the 
compensation can include the victim’s medical bills, the cost of his occupational 
and physical therapy, and any lost income.83  Mandatory restitution also covers any 
expenses that the victim incurs while participating in the investigation and trial, 
including lost income and child care expenses.84  In cases requiring mandatory 
restitution, the sentencing judge may not deny restitution based on any 
consideration of the defendant’s financial position or likely future ability to pay.85  
The United States is responsible for collecting unpaid restitution, and in fact must 
prioritize restitution payments over “[a]ll other fines, penalties, costs, and other 
payments required under the sentence.”86  The First Circuit has held that the 
government may use garnishment procedures specified in the Federal Debt 
Collection Procedures Act of 199087 even if the restitution is owed, not to the 
United States, but to a private party.88 
Even more striking than a federal crime victim’s rights to restitution are his 
enhanced rights to advocate for himself under 18 U.S.C. § 3771.89  As in Maine, a 
crime victim in federal court has the right to “be reasonably heard at any public 
                                                                                                     
 78. See 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1321 to 1330-B (2006 & Supp. 2011) (lacking any language establishing 
a right of appeal in the crime victim). 
 79. See supra note 77. 
 80. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (2000 & Supp. 2012). 
 81. Id. § 3663A(a), (c).  In the case of offenses against property, § 3663A(b)(1) requires the 
defendant to either return all of the property or else compensate the victim for the part that he is unable 
to return. 
 82. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(b)(1)-(2) (2000 & Supp. 2012). 
 83. Id. § 3663A(b)(2). 
 84. Id. § 3663A(b)(4) 
 85. See id. § 3663A(c)(3) (identifying exceptions to the requirement of mandatory restitution, 
among which is no reference to the defendant’s financial position or likely future ability to pay).  See 
also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring that the defendant’s “economic circumstances” not 
be a consideration when a sentencing judge issues a restitution order); U.S. v. Leftwich, 628 F.3d 665, 
668 (4th Cir. 2010) (contrasting mandatory and non-mandatory restitution, and reaffirming that a 
sentencing judge may not “remit” a mandatory restitution order). 
 86. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3612(c) (2000 & Supp. 2012). 
 87. 104 Stat. 4933 (codified at 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 3001-3308 (2005 & Supp. 2012)). 
 88. U.S. v. Witham, 648 F.3d 40, 41 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 89. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (Supp. 2012). 
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proceeding in the . . . court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole 
proceeding.”90  However, such a victim also has “[t]he right to full and timely 
restitution as provided in law”91—not, as in Maine, the right to have his damages 
“inquire[d] [into]” “whenever practicable” and restitution ordered when the judge 
deems it, in his discretion, to be “appropriate.”92  Furthermore, a crime victim has a 
limited right to compel a federal district court to act on the rights guaranteed in § 
3771 by motion in the jurisdiction in which either the crime is being prosecuted—
or, if it is not yet being prosecuted, in which the crime occurred.93  Even more 
remarkably, if a district court denies a victim’s motion asserting his § 3771 rights, 
the victim may petition the appropriate circuit court of appeals for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the district court to take correct action.94  The circuit courts 
of appeals are split on whether to require such a petitioner to meet the traditionally 
high standard required for a writ of mandamus or whether to grant mandamus on a 
lesser showing.95 
2.  An Illustrative Case 
U.S. v. Monzel is a useful case study in the restitution rights of a victim in the 
federal court system, and of that victim’s ability to enforce those rights under § 
                                                                                                     
 90. Id. § 3771(a)(4).  These provisions are roughly analogous to Maine’s victims’ rights provisions.  
See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1173 (2006) (plea proceeding); § 1174 (sentencing); § 1175 (release from prison). 
 91. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(6). 
 92. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1323(1) (2006).  The language in § 1325 makes even more clear that 
restitution is optional in Maine:  “Restitution may be authorized, in whole or in part, as compensation 
for economic loss. In determining the amount of restitution authorized, the following shall be 
considered:  [contributory misconduct of the victim, failure to timely report the crime, and the present 
and future financial capacity of the offender].”  Id. § 1325(1). 
 93. Id. § 3771(d)(3) (Supp. 2012).  Remarkably, even if “no prosecution is underway,” a person 
believing himself to be entitled to § 3771 rights as a crime victim may file a “motion asserting a victim’s 
rights” that the District Court must consider and decide “forthwith.” Id.  The language of the statute 
does not address whether the District Court may, on such a motion from a crime victim, order the 
appropriate federal prosecutor to take action, though the statute does expressly refuse to impinge on the 
prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or his delegates.  Id. § 3771(d)(6). 
 94. Id. §3771(d)(3). A single circuit judge must either issue the writ or give reasons for denying it 
within seventy-two hours of filing.  Id. 
 95. The Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have held that the victim must meet the traditional – and 
steep – requirements for mandamus, showing “that [the victim] has a clear and indisputable right to 
relief, that the district court has a clear duty to act, and that [the victim] has no other adequate remedy.”  
U.S. v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the traditional standard is required and 
collecting cases), cert. denied sub nom Amy v. Monzel,  132 S.Ct. 756 (2011). However, the Second, 
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied more relaxed standards.  See id. at 532-33 (collecting 
cases).  In Monzel, the D.C. Circuit implied that the controversy might have arisen because Congress 
granted what appears on its face to be an ordinary right of appeal using the archaic and infrequently used 
writ of mandamus.  See id. at 533 (analyzing arguments for applying a lesser standard than traditionally 
required for mandamus relief).  Congress’s decision to use mandamus rather than direct appeal is 
logical, however, considering that the victim is not, in American criminal law, a party to a criminal 
proceeding.  See U.S. v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that a victim 
may not appeal the sentence of a criminal offender; only the Government has that right).  But cf. infra  
Part II.C (discussing the French partie civile, in which the victim is a full “party” at a criminal 
proceeding). 
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3771.96  Michael Monzel pleaded guilty to possession and distribution of child 
pornography.97  One of his victims, “Amy” (a pseudonym), requested restitution in 
the amount of $3,263,758.98  Because Amy did not present any evidence of her 
actual damages, the district court ordered Monzel to pay $5,000 in “nominal” 
restitution.99  The court acknowledged that this was significantly less than the 
amount of economic damage that Monzel caused to Amy.100 
Amy petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit for a writ of mandamus under 
§ 3771(d)(3), seeking to compel the district court to award her the full restitution 
that she requested.101  Addressing the circuit split on the standard to apply in 
considering petitions for the writ of mandamus, the D.C. Circuit sided with the 
Sixth and Tenth Circuits, holding that the “traditional” mandamus standard applied 
to petitions under § 3771(d)(3).102  In so holding, the court noted that the remedy of 
mandamus is an “extraordinary” one and that Congress understood this in using the 
term “mandamus” in § 3771(d)(3).103 
However, the court also held that—even under the stringent traditional 
standard—Amy was entitled to the writ.104  Mandamus traditionally requires three 
elements:  that the petitioner has a “clear and indisputable right to relief, that the 
district court has a clear duty to act, and that [the petitioner] has no other adequate 
remedy.”105  Amy’s right to relief was “clear and indisputable” because the statute 
criminalizing Monzel’s conduct provided unambiguously for restitution to the 
victim in the amount of losses suffered “proximately” from the offense.106  While 
not expressly addressing the issue of “a clear duty to act,” the court’s holding 
necessarily assumes that the duty to award restitution in the actual amount of 
damages is a “clear” one, satisfying the requirements for mandamus.107  Finally, in 
holding that no other remedy available to Amy was adequate, the court 
acknowledged that “every circuit to consider the question has held that mandamus 
is a crime victim’s only recourse for challenging a restitution order.”108  While not 
                                                                                                     
 96. Monzel, 641 F.3d at 530. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 530.  As a victim of child sexual exploitation, Amy was entitled to restitution under 18 
U.S.C.A. § 2259 (2000 & Supp. 2012) rather than 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (2000 & Supp. 2012).  Sec. 
2259 provides that “[t]he order of restitution . . . shall direct the defendant to pay the victim . . . the full 
amount of the victim’s losses . . . .” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2012).  The criteria used to 
determine the amount of restitution under § 2259 are substantially similar to those used under § 3663A.  
Compare id. § 2259(b)(3) with, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663A(b)(2), (4) (2000 & Supp. 2012). 
 99. Monzel, 641 F.3d at 530. 
 100. Id. at 530-31. The District Court also declined to hold Monzel jointly and severally liable for 
Amy’s entire harm.  Id. at 531. 
 101. Id.  Amy also filed a direct appeal of Monzel’s sentence, but the D.C. Circuit held that § 3771 
does not permit a direct appeal. Id. at 541-44. 
 102. Id. at 533. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 534. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 535. 
 107. See id. at 539 (“The district court did . . . clearly err by awarding an amount of restitution it 
acknowledged was less than the harm Monzel had caused.”). 
 108. Id. at 540. 
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granting Amy the full amount that she requested, the court did order the district 
court to make findings as to the amount of Amy’s actual losses, and to order 
restitution in that amount.109 
As a victim of child pornography, Amy had a statutory right to restitution.  She 
failed to present evidence of her actual damages, instead asking for a very high 
dollar amount.  The government, evidently, did little to aid the district court in 
reaching a conclusion as to her damages,110 and the district court consequently 
made a best guess.111  Amy enforced her rights by petitioning for a writ of 
mandamus, met the high standard of review required for such a procedure, and 
compelled the district court and the government to unearth facts that would enable 
the district court to award her restitution. 
Amy’s case demonstrates the working out of the purposes of restitution.  On 
remand, the district court will have to determine how to both punish Monzel and 
make Amy whole for her financial loss with a sentence awarding restitution.112  
Under the federal restitution and victims’ rights statutes, Amy will be assured of a 
judgment awarding her restitution, and Monzel’s punishment will include highly 
personal compensation to the person he wronged.113 
                                                                                                     
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 539-40 (“In this case . . . the government failed to submit any evidence whatsoever 
regarding the amount of Amy’s losses attributable to Monzel  . . . . We expect the government will do 
more this time around [on remand] to aid the district court [in determining the proper amount of 
restitution].” (internal quotations omitted)).  Section 3771 requires the Department of Justice to make 
“best efforts” to ensure that crime victims are afforded their guaranteed rights.  18 U.S.C.A. § 
3771(c)(1) (Supp. 2012). 
 111. See Monzel, 641 F.3d at 540. (“[On remand], the district court must rely upon some principled 
method for determining the harm Monzel proximately caused.”)  The district judge, perhaps 
uncomfortable denying restitution to a victim of child pornography but lacking government evidence as 
to actual damages, just gave it “the old college try.”  Billy Sunday, “The Old College Try,” WARSAW 
UNION, Nov. 29, 1918, at 2, available at 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=3L5GAAAAIBAJ&sjid=GHsMAAAAIBAJ&dq=college-
try&pg=4386%2C5294990. 
 112. The Supreme Court denied Amy’s petition for a writ of certiorari on November 28, 2011.  Amy 
v. Monzel, 132 S.Ct. 756 (2011) (mem.).  At the time of this writing, the case had not yet been re-heard 
by the U.S. District Court for the District of D.C. 
 113. While a federal sentencing judge may not consider the ability of an offender to pay when 
determining the amount of the restitution judgment, he must consider this factor when determining the 
schedule over which the offender will make the payments.  18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(2) (2000).  Here, if 
Monzel lacked the financial resources to make an immediate lump-sum payment, his restitution 
obligation could be spread out over the period of his supervised release.  See U.S. v. Payan, 992 F.2d 
1387, 1395-96 (5th Cir. 1993) (interpreting a challenged restitution order as a “condition subsequent . . . 
of supervised release”).   
  When the supervised release period terminates, the victim may seek the unpaid balance “in the 
same manner as a judgment in a civil action.”  Id. at 1395 n.59 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (2000 & 
Supp. 2012)).  At least one federal district court has stated, in dicta, that an unpaid restitution award 
entitles a plaintiff to immediate civil judgment in the amount of the unpaid balance.  See Teachers Ins. & 
Annuity Assoc. v. Green, 636 F.Supp. 415, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); but see Lyndonville Sav. Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 703 (2d Cir. 2000) (disagreeing with Teachers Ins. & Annuity and 
holding that § 3663 creates no federal civil cause of action to enforce a restitution order).  In the context 
of bankruptcy proceedings, the Supreme Court has held that the unpaid balance on a restitution order is 
not a “debt,” which adds some weight to the view that no civil cause of action is available to enforce the 
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Had Amy’s case occurred in Maine, she would have had no sure method by 
which to challenge the sentencing court’s decision on restitution.  Maine provides 
no mechanism for a crime victim to challenge a restitution order, and Amy would 
not necessarily have found a ready advocate in the overworked state prosecutor.  At 
best, Amy would have had to make do with whatever funds the Victims’ 
Compensation Board could spare.  Amy could also have brought a civil action 
against Monzel, but such a suit could be lengthy and intrusive—particularly 
onerous conditions for the victim of a depraved crime. 
C.  Restitution and Victims’ Procedural Rights under French Law 
The French approach to restitution and the rights of crime victims is a study in 
contrasts with the American system.  The partie civile (“civil party”) procedure in 
French criminal law permits crime victims to be active, legally-empowered 
advocates for their own rights, particularly with respect to damages from the 
offender.114 
A partie civile is a person who suffers some economic injury because of 
allegedly criminal acts.115  The partie civile joins a criminal prosecution as a full 
party, and may even initiate an investigation and prosecution.116  France divides 
crimes into three overall classifications, 117 and in each case a partie civile may 
either introduce the charge or else join the action as a party at any time before 
closing arguments.118  
Rather than requiring separate statutes to enable restitution, France weaves the 
idea of restoring victims into the complete substance and procedure of its criminal 
law.  The second article of the Code de Procédure Pénal guarantees the availability 
of the civil action to “all those who have personally suffered damage directly 
caused by [a criminal offense].”119  In the Assize Court, which has jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                     
restitution order.  See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50, 53 (1986) (holding that a state criminal 
restitution order is not a “debt” for the purpose of discharge under federal bankruptcy law, because its 
purpose is to serve the “State’s interests in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim’s desire 
for compensation . . . .”); but see id.at 56-57 & n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the restitution 
order should be treated as a “debt” for bankruptcy purposes because the victim benefited by the order 
could enforce it “as a civil judgment” under federal law and some states’ laws). 
 114. See CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] arts. 1-2. (Fr.), translated in CODE OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (John Rason, trans., Legifrance 2006), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1958/13719/version/3/file/Code_34.pdf [hereinafter C. 
PR. PÉN Trans.] (stating that prosecution may be initiated by injured parties and civil action for damages 
suffered due to felonies, misdemeanors, or petty offenses is available to injured parties). 
 115. Id. art. 2. 
 116. Id. arts. 2, 85, 86. 
 117. Ranging from most to least serious, the classifications of crimes are felonies (crimes), delicts 
(délits), and contraventions (contraventions).  Richard S. Frase, Introduction to THE FRENCH CODE OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1 (Gerald L. Kock & Richard S. Frase trans., rev. ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 
1988). 
 118. See C. PR. PÉN. Trans., supra note 114, arts, 85-87 (partie civile joinder in general); id. art., 534 
(contraventions); id. art. 392 (délits); id. arts. 306-316 (setting general hearing procedures, including 
participation of the partie civile, in trials for crimes). 
 119. Id. art. 2 (emphasis added). 
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crimes (felonies), the judge, acting without the jury,120 is required to award the 
partie civile damages in the amount caused by the crime.121  No provision limits the 
award of damages based on any consideration of the defendant’s present or future 
financial position.122  Even if the defendant is acquitted of criminal liability, the 
partie civile may nonetheless petition to be awarded civil compensation for 
damages caused by the defendant.123 
The partie civile system also fully integrates victim advocacy into the 
workings of criminal procedure.  Crime victims have a broad array of procedural 
rights throughout the criminal investigation and trial.  As noted previously, the 
partie civile may bring the criminal complaint to the attention of the authorities and 
compel an investigation.124  In addition, the partie civile may require a hearing in 
camera,125 request an audiovisual recording of the proceedings,126 present witnesses 
                                                                                                     
 120. France limits the use of juries in criminal matters to trials before the Assize Court, in which 
three judges are joined by nine lay persons.  Id. arts. 244, 248, 296.  This panel determines both criminal 
guilt and sentence.  Id. arts. 355-65. 
 121. Id. art. 371.  This procedure is representative of similar procedures in the lower criminal courts.  
Reckless parties civiles beware:  the Assize Court can also award restitution from an unsuccessful 
plaintiff against the vindicated defendant.  Id. art. 371.   
 122. See id. arts. 372-373 (allowing an exception to restitution only if granting it would “present a 
danger for persons or property”).  The Assize Court can also award trial costs to the successful partie 
civile, though it may consider the financial position of both parties in making such an award.  Id. art. 
375. 
 123. Id. art. 372 (Fr.).  The Court of Cassation, the highest appellate court in the French civil court 
system, recently reversed the principle that a criminal acquittal bars civil liability if the charged crime 
had the same elements as the alleged civil wrong.  B. S.  Markesinis, Foreign Law Translations - DP 
1930. 1. 41 Case Ollagnier v. Bourbon and Malécot Subsequent developments, U. TEX. AUSTIN SCH. L. 
(Dec. 15, 2005), 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/french/case.php?id=1210 
(commentary following case translation). 
The French attitude toward standards of proof makes this rule something of a curiosity.  Even in the 
Assize Court, the French criminal system does not enunciate a standard of proof to the same exacting 
specification as the American system.  Article 353, governing the deliberations of the Assize Court, 
states:  
The law does not ask the judges to account for the means by which they convinced 
themselves; it does not charge them with any rule from which they shall specifically 
derive the fullness and adequacy of evidence.  It requires them to question themselves in 
silence and reflection and to seek in the sincerity of their conscience what impression has 
been made on their reason by the evidence brought against the accused and the arguments 
of his defense.  The law asks them but this single question, which encloses the full scope 
of their duties: are you inwardly convinced? 
C. PR. PÉN. Trans., supra note 114, art. 353.  
  In general, the plaintiff in an independent civil action has the burden to prove all elements of his 
claim, and the defendant has the burden to prove any affirmative defense.  See PETER HERZOG & 
MARTHA WESER, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, 301-11 (1967).  However, French civil courts are, like 
criminal courts, relaxed in their attitude toward the standard of proof.  See id. at 309-10 (arguing that 
because French civil courts enjoy very wide discretion in evaluating evidence, the issue of standard of 
proof is comparatively unimportant); see also GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, MODERNISING CIVIL LIABILITY 
LAW IN EUROPE, CHINA, BRAZIL AND RUSSIA 49-50 (2011) (arguing that the French standard of proof in 
civil matters is, “in fact,” much less than “beyond any reasonable doubt”). 
 124. See discussion supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 125. C. PR. PÉN. Trans., supra note 114, art. 306. 
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and evidence to the court,127 question witnesses,128 present closing arguments in 
advance of the public prosecutor,129 and file miscellaneous pleadings to the 
court.130  Additionally, the partie civile has a direct right of appeal from the civil 
judgment.131  In such an appeal, he may request an increase in damages132 and the 
payment of his legal expenses.133   
In addition to these express procedural rights, there are other legal and 
practical advantages to becoming a partie civile to a criminal matter rather than 
bringing a separate civil action.  For example, criminal proceedings move more 
quickly; the expense to the partie civile is less than if he brought civil litigation; 
and the procedures are relatively easier to manage for the victim.134  Some victims 
may not even need the assistance of counsel to participate.135 
Had Amy’s case occurred in France, Amy could have initiated or joined the 
prosecution as a partie civile.  In such a capacity, Amy would have had the burden 
to “inwardly convince” the Assize Court of her specific financial losses.136  If 
Monzel could assert an affirmative defense comparable to what he would present in 
a traditional civil action, he would bear the burden to prove it during the criminal 
trial.  Armed with evidence of Amy’s actual damages—required for her to succeed 
as a partie civile—the court would have been obliged to order restitution under C. 
PR. PÉN. art. 371.  If Amy disagreed with the Assize Court’s restitution, she would 
have a right of direct appeal from the judgment.137 
D.  Restitution and Victims’ Rights in Other U.S. States 
Restitution is available as an element of sentencing in every U.S. state.138  In 
roughly half the states, an order of restitution is mandatory, or at least required 
absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances.139  Likewise, almost every state 
                                                                                                     
 126. Id. art. 308. 
 127. Id. art. 464. 
 128. Id. art. 312. 
 129. Id. art. 346. 
 130. Id. art. 315. 
 131. Id. arts. 380-82. 
 132. Id. arts. 380-86. 
 133. Id. art. 375. 
 134. Comment, Compensating Victims of Crime: Individual Responsibility and Governmental 
Compensation Plans, 26 ME. L. REV. 125, 139 (1974) [hereinafter Compensating Victims]. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See C. PR. PÉN. Trans., supra note 114, art. 353. 
 137. Decisions of the Assize Court are appealed directly to a second, different Assize Court.  Id. art. 
380-81.  From there, appeals may be had to a Court of Appeals, and then to the Court of Cassation.  
Frase, supra note 117, at 36. 
 138. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.5(k) (3d ed. 2010). 
 139. Id. The New England states generally make restitution optional, at the discretion of the 
sentencing judge.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7043 (2011) (establishing optional restitution in 
Vermont); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:63 (2012) (establishing optional restitution in New Hampshire); 
Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 436 Mass. 829, 833, 767 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Mass. 2002) (reaffirming 
optional common-law restitution power in Massachusetts); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-28a (West 
2012) (establishing optional restitution in Connecticut); R.I. GEN. LAWS  §§ 12-19-32 to 12-19-32.1 
(2009) (establishing both optional and mandatory restitution in Rhode Island). 
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has adopted a “victims’ rights” statute of some kind, and more than half have 
enshrined this concept into their constitutions.140  This widespread adoption shows 
a clear social consensus that the rights of the victim should be in some way 
represented in the criminal justice system.  Such a focus shifts away from the 
traditionally defendant-centered perspective; victims’ rights are not among the four 
“traditional” purposes of the criminal law.141 
In the early years after the American Revolution, criminal prosecution was 
frequently initiated and conducted by the victim of a crime.142  Some states still 
preserve the use of private prosecutors.143  A private prosecution grants victims 
procedural rights that are, in some senses, analogous to the partie civile system in 
France; the private attorney may, in most cases, perform all of the procedural tasks 
that a public prosecutor would perform.144 
Recent developments in the criminal law doctrine of “abatement” provide 
another illustration of the increasing concern for victims’ rights in U.S. states.  In 
the 1970s and 1980s, state courts gradually adopted a doctrine that called for the 
dismissal of any criminal appeal during which the defendant died and the 
immediate abatement, ab initio, of the judgment of conviction.145  Maine, adopting 
this rule, cited the interest of the defendant’s family in clearing the name of the 
deceased as sufficient justification for vacating the conviction before an appeal had 
been decided.146  Recently, however, state courts have reversed course, only 
dismissing the appeal without abating the conviction.147  This has the effect of 
terminating the appellate litigation but preserving the conviction, along with any 
sentence that might have been imposed.  As a result, at least in some jurisdictions, 
the victim can collect the restitution order from the victim’s estate.148  These courts 
have cited the victim’s interests in restitution as one justification for allowing the 
                                                                                                     
 140. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 138. 
 141. See WHITE, supra note 12, at 194. 
 142. Ken Eikenberry, Victims of Crime/Victims of Justice, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 29, 34 (1987) 
 143. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE, § 7-7-8 (2012) (“No provision of this section shall be construed to 
prohibit the employment by any person of a practicing attorney to assist in the prosecution of any person 
or corporation charged with a crime.”); State v. Storm, 661 A.2d 790, 794 (N.J. 1995) (acknowledging 
the use of private prosecutors in New Jersey municipal courts).  Maine does not use private prosecutors. 
 144. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 2.07 (West 2011) (providing that a judge-
appointed prosecutor may perform all the “duties of the office”). 
 145. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 299 A.2d 891, 894-95 (Me. 1973) (adopting the rule that “the death of 
the defendant [during a direct appeal from a criminal conviction] will . . . abate the appeal and require 
dismissal of it on grounds both of mootness and the inability of the appellate tribunal to proceed because 
of loss of an indispensable party to the proceeding . . . . [W]henever the death of the defendant in a 
criminal prosecution causes a dismissal of the direct review (by appeal) of a judgment of conviction 
entered against said defendant, the judgment of conviction will be vacated and the criminal prosecution 
will be held abated, ab initio.”). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See, e.g., State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 764 (Alaska 2011) (overturning precedent to hold that 
“the interests of the victim [e.g., in restitution] . . . persist even after the defendant’s death.”); State v. 
Benn, 274 P.3d 47, ¶ 11 (Mont. 2012) (“[W]e recognize that it is possible a criminal appeal could 
involve issues which are not mooted because of a defendant’s death. For example, a restitution condition 
imposed within a criminal judgment may be enforceable by victims against the defendant’s estate.”); 
Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 795 (Va. 2011) (declining to adopt an abatement rule). 
 148. See Benn, 274 P.3d at ¶ 11. 
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conviction to stand—a justification substantial enough, in some cases, to overturn 
precedent.149  Maine, however, continues to stand by the older doctrine of 
abatement. 
IV.  ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE MAINE SYSTEM 
Maine’s statutes on restitution and victims’ rights, while functional, miss some 
opportunities to further the goals of criminal law while also serving to restore crime 
victims more fully.  Victims could be bolstered both psychologically and 
economically by enhanced procedural rights in the criminal process.  The 
incentives on offenders to actually pay restitution are currently weak.  Furthermore, 
assisting probationers in finding and keeping employment would reduce the 
problem of criminals’ frequently limited ability to pay larger restitution awards.  
Finally, tilting the balance of criminal sanction away from incarceration and toward 
restitution—particularly for non-violent criminals and those with little criminal 
history—could well be a more cost effective method of punishment. 
A.  Limited Self-Advocacy for Crime Victims 
On its own, Maine’s relative paucity of restitution rights and procedural rights 
for crime victims is not necessarily problematic.  After all, the goals of criminal 
sanction still focus primarily on the offender and his relationship to society, not on 
the victim.  However, the Maine Legislature, the U.S. Congress, and many other 
state legislatures have all recognized a legitimate purpose of the criminal law in 
making the victim whole.  This goal of criminal law, while in some ways 
awkwardly competitive with the goals of civil compensatory damages, may 
nonetheless be advanced through restitution and victims’ rights procedures.  
Maine’s current restitution and victims’ rights regimes do not fully realize 
opportunities to make victims whole on both a psychological and economic level. 
1.  The Psychological Problem 
A person who has been the victim of a crime, particularly a violent crime, is 
placed into a vulnerable and violated position.150  He may suffer long-term 
psychological trauma.151  A victim of particularly heinous or long-lasting crime 
may even adopt an attitude of “learned helplessness,”152 recreating his victimization 
                                                                                                     
 149. Alisa A. Johnson, Defendant’s Death During Appeal Doesn’t Void Prosecution Ab Initio, 
BLOOMBERG BNA CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER (Feb. 22, 2012).  
 150. See, e.g., Dean G. Kilpatrick & Randy K. Otto, Constitutionally Guaranteed Participation in 
Criminal Proceedings for Victims: Potential Effects on Psychological Functioning, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 
7, 13 (1987). 
 151. Id. at 9. 
 152. See, e.g., Judith Lewis Herman, Complex PTSD: A Syndrome in Survivors of Prolonged and 
Repeated Trauma, 5 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS No. 3 377, 384 (1992) (“[C]hronically traumatized people 
are often described as passive or helpless.  Some theorists have in fact applied the concept of ‘learned 
helplessness’ to the situation of battered women and other chronically traumatized people.”) (citations 
omitted). 
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in other areas of his life.153  Many victims—even of single crimes—suffer from 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.154   
Unfortunately, exposure to the criminal justice system can exacerbate the 
victim’s psychological trauma.155  The victim’s perception of the relative fairness 
with which the system treats him, compared to the criminal, can worsen his self-
perception of helplessness and disadvantage.156  Furthermore, a victim may lack 
knowledge about the system; may be reminded uncomfortably of the crime and the 
criminal; and may be subject to character and credibility attacks by the 
defendant.157  All of these conditions create further stress for the victim.158 
Learning new, self-respectful ways of thinking about a negative life experience 
may give a crime victim tools to overcome his trauma and stress.159  Legal self-
advocacy is one such experience that may be able to combat victimized thinking.160 
The relationship between a criminal and a victim is frequently very personal.161  
A crime victim who has the experience of participating actively in the prosecution 
and punishment of the person who hurt him has taken steps to experience a more 
positive self-image and has learned self-advocacy skills that he can apply to other 
areas of his life.  Even if the victim is not physically present in court, he receives 
reports of proceedings from his advocate, and, if so empowered, has the 
opportunity to “drive the process” himself by contributing to litigation decisions.  
Likewise, a crime victim who receives a monthly check originating from his 
offender162 throughout the course of the offender’s probation—or perhaps even 
carefully supervised personal service from that offender—can reverse the 
unbalanced power relationship that exists between victim and offender.  Either 
manifestation of this re-balanced relationship between them would work a deeper 
and more lasting “socialized revenge” than a single statement made at sentencing 
and a trip to the Victims’ Compensation Board.163 
By contrast, a victim who sits on the sidelines of the criminal justice system, as 
Maine victims to a large degree currently do, gains little psychological advantage.  
He is notified of proceedings by the government prosecutor; he depends on the 
prosecutor to inform him of his right to ask for restitution; he may stand up and 
                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at 386-87. 
 154. See Kilpatrick & Otto, supra note 150, at 16. 
 155. Id. at 18-20.  See also Marlene A. Young, A Constitutional Amendment for Victims of Crime: 
The Victims’ Perspective, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 51, 56 (1987) (“Unfortunately, no individuals or 
institutions rival the agencies of criminal justice as perpetrators of second injuries.”). 
 156. See Kilpatrick & Otto, supra note 150, at 19. 
 157. Id. at 20. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229, 244 
(2005). 
 161. See Compensating Victims, supra note 134, at 134 & n.41. 
 162. In most cases the court orders the offender to pay the clerk of the court, and the clerk in turn 
writes a check to the victim. 
 163. See supra notes 72, 77.  See also Compensating Victims, supra note 134, at 135-46 (arguing that 
government compensation does not assuage a victim’s desire for socialized revenge, whereas direct 
reparation from the criminal to the victim provides “moral restitution”). 
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speak at sentencing, but he has only a limited platform from which to present 
evidence—particularly if he is not represented by counsel.  His restitution is 
reduced or eliminated if it would be too burdensome on the criminal who hurt him 
or violated his privacy or property.  The victim has virtually no substantive legal 
rights, beyond the right to have restitution be “considered” by the court.  The 
victim’s inclination toward passivity and dependency on others would likely be 
reinforced by this process.164 
Victims’ rights advocates have long recognized the shortcomings of criminal 
justice systems that have characteristics similar to Maine’s with respect to 
victims.165  In fact, some victims’ rights advocates in the 1980s proposed adjusting 
the Sixth Amendment to include a guarantee that a crime victim has “the right to be 
present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.”166  Although 
the proposed Amendment was never enacted, the victims’ rights movement has 
made substantial progress in statutory reform, particularly at the federal level.167 
2.  The Economic Incentive Problem 
State prosecutors, with near-unanimous consistency (and substantial 
justification), report that the volume of their case loads makes it impractical to 
devote significant resources to many individual cases.168  The burden of acting as a 
social worker for a crime victim may be particularly impractical.169  As a result, a 
prosecutor may be unable to devote enough time to perform a detailed investigation 
of a victim’s damages, perhaps assuming that the victim will seek compensation 
through a civil action if the damages are of particular economic value.  However, 
the economic impact on a victim of a crime may be disproportionate to the 
economic value perceived by the prosecutor.  For instance, a $100 loss to a person 
who lives under the poverty line is, as a proportion of income, of much more 
relative significance than it would be to a State civil servant.170   
The victim himself has some incentive to provide the prosecutor with evidence 
of his economic loss, but little procedural opportunity to make an effective showing 
if the prosecutor is not inclined to pursue restitution.171  If evidence of damages is 
complex or requires witnesses, the sentencing hearing is not sufficient.  The victim 
could indeed seek compensation independently through a civil suit, but these can 
                                                                                                     
 164. See Kilpatrick & Otto, supra note 150.  See also Young, supra note 155, at 58-59 (documenting 
the emotional effects of procedural marginalization on crime victims).  Young quotes one victim 
advocate as imploring:  “All we ask is that we be treated just like a criminal.” 
 165. Arthur J. Lurigio, Wesley G. Skogan & Robert C. Davis, Criminal Victimization, in VICTIMS OF 
CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 7, 9 (Arthur J. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990). 
 166. See Eikenberry, supra note 142, at 34. 
 167. See supra Section III.B.1 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. 2012)). 
 168. See O’Hara, supra note 160, at 240. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See Young, supra note 155, 52-53 (conducting a basic economic analysis of the impact of loss 
on low-income crime victims). 
 171. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1174(1) (2006) (providing that the victim may make a statement to the 
court during sentencing, but not that the victim may directly present witnesses and evidence of his 
damages independently of the prosecutor). 
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be long, complex, uncertain, and require the victim to revisit stressful and traumatic 
details of the crime for a second time.172  Forcing the victim to resort to a civil suit 
also clogs the courts with largely redundant litigation.173  Furthermore, even 
assuming a victim can obtain a civil judgment, he does not have the added “stick” 
of a probation condition to help him collect.  By contrast, when restitution is 
assigned as a condition of probation, the amount may be split into many 
installments, but the probationer has ample incentive to make payments.174  If he 
fails, a court “may” send the probationer back to prison, at least during the period 
of probation.175 
B.  Limited Incentive for Offenders to Pay Restitution 
The word “may,” however, highlights a flaw that mars the probationer’s 
incentives under the current probation system.  Because the courts have substantial 
discretion in revoking a suspended sentence for probation violations, an offender, 
ordered to pay restitution but unwilling to do so, can often obtain near-endless 
extensions from a judge without being truly coerced by the threat of a return to 
prison.176  If judges are unwilling to use the real threat of a return to prison to 
coerce probationers to come up with the money, probationers are much less likely 
to pay their restitution. 
Maine’s “deferred disposition” statute—a sort of pre-sentencing probation—
presents a similar problem on paper, although practitioners report that it is more 
successful in actually collecting restitution payments from offenders.  Under this 
program, Class C, D, and E offenders who have pled guilty are eligible for 
“deferred disposition.”177  The court defers the offender’s sentencing on the 
condition that he meets certain court-mandated requirements,178 one of which is 
commonly the payment of restitution.  Because deferred disposition is limited to 
offenders who plead guilty,179 it will almost always arise in the context of a plea 
agreement.  Thus, the district attorney retains significant control over the 
                                                                                                     
 172. Susan Hillenbrand, Restitution and Victim Rights in the 1980s, in VICTIMS OF CRIME: 
PROBLEMS, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 188, 190 (Arthur J. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990).  See also Melvyn 
Zarr, Professor of Law, Univ. Me. Sch. of Law, Remarks to the Class of 2013 (Oct. 6, 2010) (“The civil 
trial is like a tank. It’s become so heavy it can hardly move.”). 
 173. The standard of proof in a civil trial and the standard of proof at a sentencing hearing are 
identical – the facts in both situations must be found by a preponderance of the evidence.  State v. 
Berube, 1997 ME 165, ¶ 19, 698 A.2d 509. 
 174. While this may occur in many restitution situations, probation itself may not be ordered for 
some class D or E crimes.  17-A M.R.S.A. § 1201(1) (2006 & Supp. 2011).  Probation may also not be 
ordered for a murder conviction.  Id. 
 175. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1206(7-A) (2006 & Supp. 2011).  See also supra note 113 (discussing the 
uncertain availability of a federal civil cause of action to recover the balance of a restitution order after 
the period of supervised release ends). 
 176. See § 1206(7-A).  Sources familiar with state criminal courtrooms report that this is a serious 
problem in practice as well as in theory. 
 177. 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1348 to 1348-C (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 178. Id. § 1348-A(1). 
 179. Id. 
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conditions to which the offender agrees.180  Furthermore, courts retain the authority 
and discretion to modify the deferred disposition conditions if they impose an 
“unreasonable burden” on the offender.181  Thus, an offender delinquent in his 
restitution payments can obtain extensions and waivers from a court, just as he can 
during probation.  Nonetheless, as noted above, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
deferred disposition usually produces more consistent restitution payments than 
does probation. 
C.  Missed Opportunity for More Cost-Effective Criminal Sanction 
A criminal sentence can be a collection of elements:  incarceration,182 fines,183 
asset forfeiture,184 and restitution185 are among them.  Incarceration costs for 
offenders continue to be a massive burden on Maine’s budget, as in many other 
states.186  In response to this financial burden, many states have developed 
sentencing alternatives that serve the goals of criminal law without requiring costly 
incarceration.  For instance, alternative sentencing programs, such as “mental 
health courts,” can reduce long-term prison costs by reducing recidivism rates.187  
Maine has experimented with just such alternatives, with a partly successful 
record.188 
Using probation and restitution with serious suspended sentences more 
frequently—along with the real threat of a return to prison for failure to pay—could 
serve as an economically viable alternative to incarceration, particularly for non-
violent and non-career criminals.  A short prison term would give the offender a 
taste of prison life (at a modest cost to the state), and the long probation period 
                                                                                                     
 180. The victim is included in the process only at the discretion of the district attorney.  See id.  Thus, 
this scheme suffers from the same flaw as does the current procedure for ordering restitution as a 
component of a sentence:  the victim is on the sidelines of the process. 
 181. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1348-A(2) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 182. Id. §§ 1251-52. 
 183. Id. §§ 1301-34. 
 184. Id. § 1158-A. 
 185. Id. §§ 1321 – 1330-B. 
 186. See Heather Steeves, Maine prison offers free college in effort to reduce repeat offenders, save 
money, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 14, 2011, available at 
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/01/14/news/maine-prison-offers-free-college-in-effort-to-reduce-
repeat-offenders-save-money/ (reporting the Maine Department of Corrections’ budget at $143 million 
for 2010-2011, and noting that Maine spends $44,000 per prisoner year, compared to a national average 
of $29,000).  See also Jeff Potts, American Penal Institutions and Two Alternative Proposals for 
Punishment, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 443, 453 (1993) (discussing the “staggering” financial costs of building 
and operating penal institutions). 
 187. See John E. Cummings, Comment, The Cost of Crazy: How Therapeutic Jurisprudence and 
Mental Health Courts Lower Incarceration Costs, Reduce Recidivism, and Improve Public Safety, 56 
LOY. L. REV. 279, 281 (2010) (connecting lower recidivism rates with lower per capita incarceration 
costs). 
 188. See Judy Harrison, High recidivism rate spells end to Bangor drug court, BANGOR DAILY 
NEWS, Sept. 22, 2011, available at http://bangordailynews.com/2011/09/21/news/bangor/adult-drug-
court-closing-in-bangor-courts-spokeswoman-cites-high-recidivism-rates/ (noting that the state was 
about to shut down an under-performing “drug court” to re-allocate funds to more efficient and 
successful mental health courts that had adapted to lessons learned from the experience). 
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would make it easier for him to comply with the restitution condition of probation.  
Steady, financially manageable restitution payments, spread out over a long period 
of time, would permit the offender to make relatively complete repayment to the 
victim, while vindicating the victim’s sense of dignity and self-worth. 189   
Of course, even with strong incentives to keep probationers motivated to make 
payments, some probationers will struggle to find employment after being released 
from prison.  Not every probationer who misses a restitution payment is trying to 
cheat the system; some genuinely lack the ability to pay.  Delinquent probationers 
of both sorts can make it difficult to distinguish those who are making a good faith 
but unsuccessful effort to pay from those who could pay but do not.  This might 
explain why some judges could be hesitant to revoke suspended sentences in 
response to failures to pay restitution; it is, perhaps, better to err on the side of 
mercy.  Section V, below, will offer one possible solution to this problem. 
In sum, although judges are currently required to consider restitution at 
sentencing,190 allowing victims to advocate for restitution more directly than they 
can at present would strengthen restitution’s appeal.191  However, for restitution to 
be an effective alternative to incarceration, offenders need both strong incentives to 
make restitution payments and some flexibility and support when they are 
genuinely unable to make payments.  The next section will propose legislative 
changes to accomplish all of these goals. 
V.  REFORMS THAT ENHANCE VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND THE USE OF RESTITUTION 
If one accepts that the Maine Legislature views honoring a crime victim’s 
restitution rights as a legitimate goal of criminal sanction, it follows that both the 
rules of criminal procedure and the substantive rights of victims should advance 
this goal.  At present, Maine’s statutory support for victim restitution is 
comparatively narrow.192  At the very least, Maine could follow the U.S. federal 
model, adopting provisions analogous to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act to give 
crime victims procedural and substantive rights with respect to restitution.193  
Enhancements to the “script” of the sentencing colloquy could also help to prompt 
victims to speak out about their economic damages.  However, Maine has an 
opportunity to go further and experiment with enhanced crime victim participation 
                                                                                                     
 189. Regrettably, the Law Court has looked with some disfavor on just such a creative application of 
probation and restitution by the lower courts. See State v. Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 14 & n.5, 916 A.2d 
210 (implying that assembling numerous consecutive sentences to establish a long probationary period, 
making an “otherwise impossibly large amount of restitution” financially manageable for the defendant, 
might violate an element of judicial discretion afforded by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(2) (2006)). 
 190. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1323(1). 
 191. See supra Part III.A (discussing procedural limitations of Maine’s victims’ rights provisions). 
 192. See supra Part III (comparing Maine’s victims’ rights and restitution statutes with federal and 
foreign national models). 
 193. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (2000 & Supp. 2012)).  Maine could, 
for instance, provide either a direct appeal for a crime victim from a restitution order, as in the French 
model, or else an appeal via a petition for mandamus, as in the U.S. federal model. 
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in the legal system.194 
A.  Some Previous Proposals for Enhancement of Victims’ Procedural Rights 
Since at least the 1970s, victims’ advocates have seen criminal procedure as a 
vehicle to aid crime victims.195  Early on, the Brooklyn Criminal Court briefly 
experimented with a “Victim Involvement Project,” in which “victim advocates” 
participated in the criminal proceeding to ensure that the victim’s interests were 
represented.196  The first major changes in the federal courts emerged in 1982 in the 
President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, resulting in the Omnibus Victim and 
Witness Protection Act.197  In the 1980s and 1990s, scholars suggested 
enhancements to the procedural mechanisms for compensating crime victims,198 
increasing the use of the Victim Impact Statement in state courts,199 enhancing 
victims’ access to courtrooms,200 and increasing the use of restitution at the expense 
of other forms of punishment.201  Others proposed adding language to the Sixth 
Amendment to give crime victims constitutionally protected procedural rights, as 
noted above.202  Still others fought a rearguard action for the common law system 
of private prosecutions.203 
In 1974, this journal proposed an experimental procedure in which portions of 
the French partie civile system would be adopted in Maine criminal trials.204  The 
proposed procedure would treat the victim as “in all respects a party to the 
prosecution—from sitting with the state’s attorney at counsel table to assisting the 
prosecutor in the preparation of the case where appropriate.”205  The proposal 
qualified this participation, however:  “Prosecutorial discretion would . . . be 
strictly maintained.”206  All constitutional protections for the defendant would 
                                                                                                     
 194. “[A] single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments . . . .”  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 195. See Lurigio et al., supra note 165, at 8. 
 196. See Eikenberry, supra note 142, at 36-37.  The “VIP” program failed in part because 
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 197. See Lurigio et al., supra note 165, at 8.  
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 202. See Eikenberry, supra note 142, at 34.  The proposed additional sentence would have read:  
“The victim in every criminal proceeding shall have the right to be present and to be heard at all critical 
stages of judicial proceedings.”  Id. 
 203. Id. at 35. 
 204. Compensating Victims, supra note 134, at 145-47. 
 205. Id. at 146. 
 206. Id. 
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remain.207  Finally, and most significantly with respect to restitution, this journal 
proposed that “[a]t the conclusion of the trial, the victim would be allowed to 
present evidence on the issue of damages.”208  Because evidence of damages would 
be highly prejudicial to the defendant, this evidence would be presented after the 
verdict if the case was tried to a jury.209 
Curiously, this journal opined that “[t]he effects of the proposed procedure are 
essentially psychological.  Little is done to change the conduct of the trial.”210  This 
conclusion was somewhat at odds with the proposal.  After all, permitting the 
victim to be a “party to the prosecution” and affording him a procedural window in 
which to present evidence of his damages would seem, realistically, to have a 
meaningful impact on both the adjudication of guilt or innocence and on the 
imposition of a sentence.  Nonetheless, this journal saw the primary goal of the 
proposal as “re-focus[ing] the ways in which crime and restitution are perceived by 
the victim, the offender, and the society.”211  It was hoped that the more victim-
focused procedure would encourage judges to use restitution more frequently and 
more “creative[ly].”212  At its root, the proposal aimed to counter the perception 
that victim compensation is the responsibility of the government, and restore a 
sense of individual responsibility between the offender and victim.213 
B.  Proposed Changes to Maine’s Restitution and Victims’ Rights Statutes 
With some refinements, this journal’s 1974 proposal can be made more 
effective and palatable in Maine’s current criminal justice system.  This section 
proposes an addition to Maine’s victims’ rights statute, to which it will refer as 17-
A M.R.S.A. § 1174-B.214  The statute would be premised on two theories:  (1) that 
crime victims are better served by having the opportunity to participate actively in 
the determination of their restitution awards, and (2) that it is better and cheaper for 
most offenders to be punished by working to repay their victims than it is for them 
to be imprisoned.215  Sec. 1174-B would create an additional procedural window in 
which a crime victim may, independently of the prosecutor, present evidence of his 
damages flowing from the crime.  It would also establish conditions under which 
                                                                                                     
 207. Id. at 147. 
 208. Id. at 146. 
 209. Id. at 146 n. 97. 
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being made a servant of his victim, in the same way that he is made a servant of the State when he is 
imprisoned.  Compared to imprisonment, the offender’s punishment is more personal and immediate by 
his servitude to the victim.  From a rehabilitation perspective, giving the offender the ability to work 
during his punishment, particularly with support and assistance from the State, should in theory help to 
reduce recidivism and help the offender to develop more constructive social and professional skills. 
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restitution is a mandatory element of sentencing, a right in the crime victim to 
appeal the restitution order, and a sentencing guideline by which prison time can be 
suspended in proportion to the amount of the restitution award as a percentage of 
the defendant’s projected annual income.  The proposed statute relieves some 
burden on the prosecutor and shifts it to the party most interested in the outcome 
with respect to restitution—the crime victim.  It acknowledges some of the value of 
the old private prosecution system, while maintaining almost all of the discretion 
currently entrusted to the public prosecutor and judge.  It would also advance the 
stated purpose of restitution as a criminal sanction by ensuring that a victim is 
made whole for his loss while still meaningfully punishing the offender.  Finally, it 
would aim to reduce prison costs and shift corrections resources toward re-
establishing the offender as a productive wage earner. 
Some elements of the proposed changes codify what already happens in the 
criminal sentencing process, serving in large part to educate victims.  As noted 
above, the victim does currently have the opportunity to address the court at 
sentencing and request restitution.  He may even present limited evidence of his 
damages.  With appropriate “scripting” of the sentencing colloquy, the victim could 
be prompted to address his economic damages—although he would need to be 
notified in advance of the sentencing hearing to effectively gather the evidence.  
Likewise, the defendant already has a limited opportunity to dispute the victim’s 
evidence of damages.  Seen from this perspective, the “Damages Hearing” 
described below takes this existing practice, expands it slightly, and makes it more 
consistent with a civil bench trial.  It also gives the defendant a more formal 
opportunity to dispute the victim’s evidence of damages and to assert affirmative 
defenses. 
1.  The Damages Hearing 
Sec. 1174-B would create a Damages Hearing—a procedural window in which 
the crime victim could, at his option, present evidence and witnesses regarding his 
damages flowing from the crime.  The Damages Hearing would, on the victim’s 
motion, take place before the court ordered the production of any presentence 
investigation report (“PSI Report”); the probation officer preparing the PSI Report 
could then incorporate the information from the Damages Hearing.  At such a 
hearing, the crime victim could call witnesses and enter evidence into the record 
just as the prosecutor would during the trial.216  As in a traditional civil trial, the 
defendant would have the opportunity to impeach the victim’s witnesses and 
evidence and to introduce his own rebuttal witnesses and evidence.  The sentencing 
judge would be required to consider this evidence when deciding whether to award 
restitution.  To avoid unduly interfering with the prosecutor’s efforts, the crime 
victim would be required to notify the prosecutor in advance of any witnesses and 
                                                                                                     
 216. To preserve the defendant’s right to be convicted only by a jury, and only by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, this post-verdict damages evidence would not be considered on appeal with regard to 
the defendant’s guilt or innocence.  Rather, it could only be considered in an appeal on the issue of the 
award of restitution.  Evidence that was included in the prosecution’s main case against the defendant 
would continue to be reviewed normally on appeal. 
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evidence he planned to present during a Damages Hearing.  Likewise, the 
defendant would be permitted to perform limited discovery regarding the witnesses 
and evidence to be presented by the victim so as to enable an effective defense.217 
Following the Damages Hearing, the sentencing court would be required to 
make findings of fact as to the amount of the crime victim’s loss. “Recovery” by 
way of restitution would continue to be limited to actual, non-speculative financial 
loss, and would not include any amounts attributable to pain and suffering.  The 
victim would have the burden of production as to damages and causation; the 
defendant would bear the burden of production as to any affirmative defense.  For 
instance, if the defendant could prove that the plaintiff was partly responsible for 
his own damages, then the sentencing court could reduce the restitution award 
proportionally, as in comparative negligence.218  The sentencing court would be 
directed to find facts by a preponderance of the evidence, matching the current 
standard for fact-finding at sentencing.219 
The sentencing court would, with one exception, continue to have the current 
level of discretion as to sentencing.  Following some elements of 18 U.S.C. § 
3663A,220 restitution would be mandatory for any violent crime and for any crime 
against property.  In such cases, as in the federal system, it would be reversible 
error for the court to fail to order restitution.221  Such mandatory restitution gives 
effect to the basic purpose of the enhanced procedure:  that if the victim can prove 
he suffered non-speculative pecuniary loss, the court will order the defendant to 
make the victim whole.  This would make the restitution award somewhat more 
analogous to a civil money judgment, which necessarily follows, absent judgment 
as a matter of law,222 from the jury’s finding of the amount of the plaintiff’s 
damages. 
2.  Effects of Restitution on a Later Civil Trial 
As noted above, restitution ordered under § 1174-B would not include 
damages attributable to pain and suffering.  However, the victim would continue to 
have the right to bring an additional civil action after the criminal trial, and any 
damages he recovered in the civil action would be reduced by the amount of his 
restitution.223  Thus, if the victim wished to recover damages for pain and suffering, 
he could do so through the vehicle of a civil action.  To simplify the civil trial, the 
criminal conviction (or guilty plea) would have res judicata effect on the 
defendant’s civil liability for the harm resulting from the crime.  Consequently, the 
                                                                                                     
 217. This was precisely the problem that led to a request for post-conviction review in Griffin v. 
State.  See supra note 47. 
 218. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (2003 & Supp. 2011) (adopting a modified comparative negligence rule 
in Maine). 
 219. State v. Walker, 675 A.2d 499, 501 (Me. 1996). 
 220. This Comment does not suggest that restitution be mandatory for drug crimes, as in 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000 & Supp. 2012). 
 221. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(3) (Supp. 2012) (establishing a procedure to correct errors by federal 
sentencing judges using a writ of mandamus). 
 222. ME. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (1993). 
 223. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1327 (1977). 
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only issue of fact at the civil trial would be the causation and amount of damages 
attributable to pain and suffering.   
Sec. 1174-B would require that, in a civil trial to recover damages for pain and 
suffering, punitive damages are disallowed if restitution has been awarded under 
the terms of the new statute.  Traditionally, the purpose of punitive damages has 
been to punish the wrongdoer, not to make the plaintiff whole; by contrast, the 
purpose of restitution is precisely to make the victim whole.  However, by 
replacing some period of imprisonment with restitution—on which more below—
the new § 1174-B expands the purpose of restitution to also serve as one of the 
primary methods of punishing the offender.  Thus, in almost all situations, punitive 
damages would unfairly duplicate the monetary punishment on the offender; the 
justice system has already meted out a monetary punishment through restitution. 
3.  The Right of Appeal 
To ensure that crime victims’ rights are respected in the criminal proceeding, § 
1174-B would grant victims an express right to petition the Law Court for a Writ of 
Mandamus, similar to the provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3)224.  This right 
would be limited only to appeals from (1) the sentencing judge’s findings of fact as 
to the amount of the victim’s damages, and (2) the sentencing court’s order of 
restitution.  Should the victim establish to the satisfaction of the Law Court that the 
sentencing court clearly erred in its determination of the victim’s damages or in its 
award of restitution, the writ could issue, requiring the sentencing court to correctly 
apply the restitution statute.  The standard of review for mandamus under § 1174-B 
should be for “abuse of discretion or legal error”; this would permit a more 
scrutinizing review on appeal than is traditionally used in mandamus 
proceedings.225   
Although a victim could challenge a sentencing court’s restitution order, the 
victim could not challenge a sentencing court’s decision to vary from the guideline 
reduction to the offender’s term of imprisonment, discussed in more detail 
below.226  The victim’s interest in such a variance is much less than the offender’s 
and the State’s interests; the right to appeal a variance should lie only with the 
offender or the prosecutor. 
4.  Converting Prison Time to Supervised Release with Restitution;  
Exceptions and Judicial Discretion 
Part of the rationale for adopting the proposed § 1174-B would be to reduce 
prison costs.  One way to do this would be to adjust the balance of sentencing 
elements away from imprisonment and toward restitution.  To meet this goal, § 
1174-B would provide a guideline by which a judge should convert, for certain 
                                                                                                     
 224. Mandamus is preferable to direct appeal because, as noted previously, the victim is not a party 
to the criminal prosecution.  See supra note 95.  Direct appeals are limited to parties.  Id. 
 225. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for C.D. Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006).  The Kenna court 
applied this standard to a petition for a writ of mandamus under § 3771(d)(3). 
 226. See infra, Part V.B.4 (describing the guideline reduction in prison sentence and the mechanism 
for variance). 
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classes of crimes, a sentence of imprisonment into a suspended sentence, with 
payment of restitution as a condition of probation.  This guideline would take into 
account both the amount of restitution and the financial impact that the restitution 
will have on the defendant; it would, after all, be unjust to permit a wealthy 
defendant to “buy down” his prison time by paying a large restitution. 
The guideline would ask the judge to estimate the likely annual income of the 
defendant—from all sources—after he is released from prison and compare that to 
the amount of annual restitution payments (with compounded interest), assuming 
the restitution is spread out over the lifetime of the period of probation.  Thus, for a 
$10,000 restitution award (including capitalized interest) assigned to an offender 
who would be on probation for ten years,227 and who is likely to earn $20,000 per 
year upon release, this “restitution quotient” would be 1/20, or 5%.228  This 
quotient represents the impact of the restitution payments on the offender, adjusted 
for his income.  For each 1% of the restitution quotient, the defendant would be 
eligible for one year—or, for a more granular approach, 365 days—deducted from 
his prison sentence.  In the example above, this would result in a 5-year reduction 
in the prison sentence.  If the defendant above were instead projected to earn 
$100,000 per year upon release—an unusual case, but not impossible—the quotient 
would be 1/100, or 1%.229  His prison sentence would be reduced by just one year 
instead of five, reflecting the fact that the restitution will have a lesser financial 
impact on the wealthier defendant than on the poorer defendant.230  The statute 
                                                                                                     
 227. Four years is the maximum period of probation for most Class A crimes, but for sexual crimes 
against persons under the age of twelve, the probation period can last up to eighteen years.  17-A 
M.R.S.A. §§ 1202(1), (1-A) (2006 & Supp. 2011).  For Class D and E crimes, the maximum probation 
period is one year.  Id.  The guideline formula could be adjusted to accommodate these shorter 
maximum probation periods.  Such an adjustment should maintain a compelling “stick” of prison time 
as punishment for violating probation conditions while also making a meaningful comparison between 
the defendant’s post-prison annual income and the shorter period during which he is required to make 
restitution to the victim. 
 228. $10,000 divided by 10 years’ probation is $1,000 per year; divided again by the projected post-
release gross annual income of $20,000 yields 1/20. 
 229. $10,000 divided by 10 years’ probation is $1,000 per year; divided again by the projected post-
release gross annual income of $100,000 yields 1/100. 
 230. As an alternative to this method of calculating the reduction, the statute could instead use a 
simpler formula.  An offender could opt to pay one year’s income to reduce his prison time by one year, 
and likewise for additional years or smaller fractions of one year.  This money would be given first to 
the victim until he had been fully compensated, and then would be used as additional funds for the work 
assistance program.  See infra, Section V.B.4 (describing the proposed work assistance program for 
probationers).  There would still be a limit, defined by class of crime, on the reduction amount; this 
would ensure that offenders served at least some of their sentences of imprisonment, in an amount 
proportional to the blameworthiness of their crimes.  Payment of restitution would continue to be a 
condition of supervised release.   
  This alternative has the interesting effect of permitting an offender to choose to make a financial 
contribution to both the victim and to the State in lieu of imposing the burden of his incarceration costs 
on both.  This element of choice on the part of the offender could have profound advantages from a 
penological perspective; the offender’s choice reinforces the personal responsibility he bears for the 
damage he caused.  However, it also makes restitution optional, and shifts the focus of restitution away 
from the victim and onto the offender.  Because the Maine Legislature is correct that restitution is itself 
a desirable goal of the criminal law – and because the goal of the proposed statute is to empower the 
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would also expressly approve the practice of accumulating consecutive probation 
periods for multiple counts so as to lengthen the overall probation period and make 
payment of a larger restitution award feasible for the defendant.231 
The proposed statute must be practical to be effective.  To satisfy our need for 
“socialized revenge” and make the statute politically feasible, no sentence could be 
reduced below certain minima per class of crime.232  For instance, for a Class A 
crime, the minimum below which restitution could not reduce the sentence might 
be two years.  Likewise, to prevent unrealistic and unenforceable restitution orders, 
the total restitution amount would be capped at 50% of the defendant’s total 
estimated post-release annual income over the probation period.  If, in the example 
above, the restitution amount was $1,000,000, but the defendant’s estimated post-
release annual income were only $30,000 over a ten year probation period, then the 
restitution amount would be capped at $150,000.233 
To ensure that the defendant is motivated to pay the restitution, the sentence 
reduction reached by applying the guideline would be converted into a 
proportionally higher suspended sentence.  A 1% restitution quotient would reduce 
the prison sentence by one year, but convert that year into one and a half years of 
suspended sentence.  Continuing the example above, the offender’s prison sentence 
would be reduced from ten years to five years, but those five years would be 
replaced with a suspended sentence of seven and a half years.  Monthly payments 
toward the restitution would be a condition of probation. 
Even with these higher suspended sentences, Maine courts retain the discretion 
to vacate all, some, or none of the suspended sentence when a probationer violates 
the terms of his probation.234  While this is entirely appropriate in most 
circumstances, this discretion may permit some recalcitrant probationers to avoid 
restitution payments that they would otherwise find a way to make.  To put teeth 
behind § 1174-B’s larger suspended sentences, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1206(7-A) should 
be amended to require that, for the second and all subsequent violations of a 
probation condition requiring payment of restitution under § 1174-B, the court shall 
vacate at least some pre-determined number of days of the suspended sentence for 
each violation.  The required number of days should escalate with each subsequent 
violation; for instance, the first violation could result in the vacation of at least ten 
                                                                                                     
victim psychologically while also making him whole economically – the Legislature should be wary of 
adopting this alternative. 
  Nonetheless, I am indebted to colleague Kristian Terison for suggesting this insightful 
alternative. 
 231. This would counter the disapproval expressed by the Law Court for such a scheme in State v. 
Downs.  See supra note 189.  If necessary, another condition for the use of consecutive sentences could 
be added at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(2) (2006 & Supp. 2011), specifying that consecutive sentences of 
probation may be used to extend the period of probation to allow for supervised payment of a restitution 
order over a longer time. 
 232. The limit on the period of reduction is distinct from a minimum sentence of imprisonment. The 
judge is still free to impose any sentence of imprisonment within his statutory authority. 
 233. $30,000 projected post-release gross annual income, divided in half, is $15,000.  Multiplied by 
ten years over which he will make the payments, the defendant’s total restitution amount is capped at 
$150,000. 
 234. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1206(7-A) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
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days of the suspended sentence, the next in at least twenty days, and so on.  Courts 
should retain the discretion to waive this mandatory penalty only on a finding of 
extreme financial hardship to the probationer.  Proper implementation of the work 
assistance and supervision program, described in detail below, should make such 
waivers rare. 
Finally, the approach outlined in this section would not work for every 
offender.  For certain dangerous or repeat offenders, the guideline would be 
suspended or disallowed in favor of a more traditional incarceration program.  To 
preserve judicial discretion in sentencing, a sentencing judge could vary from the 
result reached under the guideline as to reduction in the period of imprisonment, 
subject on appeal to review for reasonableness.235  This standard would give the 
Law Court the ability to ensure that sentencing courts follow the spirit of the statute 
while also allowing for flexibility in unusual cases. 
5.  Work Assistance and Supervision for Probationers;  
Two Model Maine Programs 
Even offenders who might benefit from a reduced prison sentence under § 
1174-B might struggle at first to find work and make restitution payments, putting 
them at risk of violating their probation conditions and returning to prison.  This 
leaves neither the crime victim nor the probationer better off.  To ease the 
probationer’s transition back to society and increase the likelihood that the victim 
will actually receive restitution, § 1174-B would also provide for and fund a work 
assistance and mental health program for offenders newly released from prison.  
Such a program would combine increased probation oversight with either work 
placement assistance or direct, but temporary, employment by the State or a State-
funded non-profit organization.  Funds for the assistance program could be 
reallocated from the prisons in anticipation of a reduced inmate population.  If early 
experiments with the system showed that probationers still had difficulty finding 
employment during their period of supervised release, Maine could also consider 
prohibiting employers from denying employment based solely on past felonies 
during the probation period.236  This would have the added advantage of giving 
newly released probationers the opportunity to establish a positive work record, 
aiding them in finding future employment after their supervised release periods 
end. 
Maine Pretrial Services (MPS), an independent non-profit organization that 
                                                                                                     
 235. This requirement would be similar to the requirements placed on sentencing judges in federal 
courts.  A judge must “consult [the Federal Sentencing Guidelines] and take them into account when 
sentencing,” but may vary from the guidelines for good cause.  U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 200, 264 
(2005).  Sentencing decisions are reviewed on appeal for “unreasonableness.” Id.  See also supra 
Section V.B.3 (describing the elements of a restitution sentence subject to appeal by the victim and by 
the prosecutor).  
 236. Realistically, this would require that the State prevent criminal record checks from revealing the 
presence of any felony while the probationer is currently serving his period of supervised release.  This 
could be made more palatable to the business community by providing a fund to insure against harm 
caused by a probationer whose felonies were suppressed from the results of a criminal record check by 
the employer. 
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provides “pretrial bail supervision of defendants who are charged with crimes or 
probation violations,” is a public/private partnership model that the state could use 
as the foundation of the § 1174-B work assistance program.237  MPS provides a 
“least restrictive bail alternative,” for defendants who either cannot pay bail or who 
a court determines need extra supervision if released before trial.238  Among other 
things, MPS recommends appropriate bail conditions, preferring the least 
restrictive conditions consistent with public safety, and provides “community 
supervision and monitoring of court-ordered conditions of release.”239  Critically, 
MPS also helps select defendants to participate in Maine’s Co-occurring Disorders 
Court, Family Treatment Drug Court, Adult Treatment Drug Court, and the 
Kennebec Regional Re-Entry Project.240  MPS mainly works with defendants prior 
to their trial or probation revocation hearing.241 
MPS is not without flaws.  A 2006 study, commissioned by the state’s 
Corrections Alternatives Advisory Committee,242 concluded that MPS was only 
offered consistently in twelve of sixteen counties, services were not standardized 
across counties, and the scope of services was below the national standards for 
pretrial services programs because of a lack of state funding.243  Nonetheless, these 
findings do not cast doubt on the strength of the model; rather, they show that 
Maine is not yet fully implementing it.244 
Creative Work Systems (CWS), another independent Maine non-profit 
organization, helps people with “cognitive, physical and psychiatric disabilities” to 
find and keep employment in Maine.245  CWS helps its clients find appropriate 
employment, provides job skills training, and assists employers to accommodate 
special needs workers.246  CWS also maintains ongoing contact with both clients 
and their employers to provide support for unexpected difficulties and ensure that 
the clients remain employed.247  For some clients, CWS maintains an outsourced 
staffing practice under the “Pine Tree Business Solutions” brand, directly 
employing the disabled clients and providing managed services to local 
                                                                                                     
 237. Maine Pretrial Services, ME. PRETRIAL SERVICES 1, http://mainepretrial.org/resources/revised-
mps-info-sheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 238. Marie VanNostrand, Gena Keebler, Patrick Jablonski & Brian Kays, Pretrial Case Processing 
in Maine: A Study of Efficiency & Effectiveness, ME. PRETRIAL SERVICES 33 (Sept. 2006), 
http://mainepretrial.org/resources/case-processing-study.pdf [hereinafter Pretrial Case Processing]. 
 239. Objectives, ME. PRETRIAL SERVICES, http://mainepretrial.org/objectives.asp (last visited Apr. 
22, 2012). 
 240. Programs, ME. PRETRIAL SERVICES, http://mainepretrial.org/programs.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 
2012). 
 241. See Objectives, supra note 239. 
 242. Pretrial Case Processing, supra note 238, at 1. 
 243. Id. at 151-52.  Despite the 2006 report, MPS still only operates in twelve of sixteen Maine 
counties.  Programs, supra note 240. 
 244. See Pretrial Case Processing, supra note 238, at 152 (describing specific benefits of a pretrial 
services program that meets national standards, including economic benefits to the corrections system). 
 245. About Creative Work Systems, CREATIVE WORK SYS., 
http://www.creativeworksystems.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 246. Employment Services, CREATIVE WORK SYS., 
http://www.creativeworksystems.com/employment-services/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 247. Id. 
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businesses.248 
The § 1174-B work assistance program could either be state-managed through 
Probation Services or else could follow a model that combines elements of both 
MPS and CWS.  In the latter case, the state could establish funding for one or more 
independent non-profit organizations that would provide work assistance and 
supervision support to probationers.  The organizations would work in parallel and 
in cooperation with both Probation Services and with the Central Maine Pre-
Release Center, which provides pre-release work opportunities for prisoners during 
the last fourteen months of their sentences.249  The funding would require that 
recipient organizations provide support to probationers in finding and keeping 
work, meeting the requirements of drug and mental health courts, and making 
restitution payments.  For probationers particularly difficult to place with 
employers, the organizations could be authorized to employ the probationers 
directly.  As with other alternative sentencing programs, the State should expect to 
save money in the long term by reducing the expensive prison inmate population 
and shifting resources to community support programs that keep probationers 
employed, drug-free, and in compliance with the terms of their probation—such as 
making restitution payments. 
C.  Likely Outcomes of the Proposed Changes 
If Amy’s case were to occur in Maine after the adoption of proposed § 1174-B, 
the criminal prosecution would be conducted according to today’s criminal 
procedure until after Monzel’s guilty plea or conviction.  Amy would then move 
the sentencing court to schedule a Damages Hearing.  The sentencing judge would 
be required to schedule the hearing to occur within some reasonable time period; 
perhaps two to four weeks.  At the Damages Hearing, Amy—through active 
participation with her counsel—would have the burden to show her actual, 
financial damages caused by Monzel’s actions.  Monzel would assert, as an 
affirmative defense, that because he did not personally commit every act of 
distributing the photos and video, he is not personally responsible for the whole of 
Amy’s financial loss.  Thus, he should not be held jointly and severally liable for 
the damages.250  The sentencing court would find, as fact, what portion of Amy’s 
damages were directly and proximately attributable to Monzel’s possession and 
distribution of the images and video.  Then, unless the court chose to exercise the 
discretion afforded it under § 1174-B, it would issue a Restitution Order 
compelling Monzel to compensate Amy. 
Assume, hypothetically, that the sentencing court found that Monzel was likely 
                                                                                                     
 248. Pine Tree Business Solutions, CREATIVE WORK SYS., 
http://www.creativeworksystems.com/pine-tree-business-solutions/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 249. Adult Community Corrections, ME. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, 
http://www.maine.gov/corrections/adult/index.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 250. In Monzel’s original restitution order, the District Judge limited the restitution award for 
precisely this reason.  U.S. v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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to earn $30,000 per year upon release from prison.251  Assume also that the 
sentencing court found Amy’s actual damages flowing from Monzel’s possession 
and distribution to be $1,000,000.  Finally, assume that the court would, absent § 
1174-B, have ordered a sentence of ten years imprisonment and ten years of 
probation.  Monzel’s restitution amount would be capped at $150,000.252  Because 
$15,000 per year is 50% of his projected annual gross income after release, 
Monzel’s restitution quotient is one-half, or 50%.  This would produce a reduction 
of fifty years, exceeding the ten year sentence.253  Thus, absent the minimum period 
of imprisonment below which restitution cannot lower the sentence, all of Monzel’s 
prison term would be eliminated by the restitution quotient.  However, for a Class 
A crime, the restitution quotient would be prevented from lowering the period of 
imprisonment below two years, ensuring that Monzel serve at least some time in 
prison.254   
Upon release, Monzel would have ten years during which to pay back the 
$150,000 restitution amount.255  Making each monthly payment would be one of 
the terms of his probation.  Because § 1174-B reduced his sentence by eight years, 
his suspended sentence would be twelve years.256  The § 1174-B work assistance 
and mental health program would help Monzel to find and keep employment, both 
to help rehabilitate him and to make sure that Amy receives her restitution 
payments. 
This outcome is advantageous to Amy, to the State, and, within reason, to 
Monzel.  Amy has been awarded a restitution amount that is, while less than her 
actual damages, an amount that she stands at least a good chance of actually 
receiving.  Amy knows that Monzel will be punished with both prison time and a 
long period during which a very large portion of his income is redirected to Amy.  
Most importantly, Amy has taken an active role, supported by the criminal justice 
system, in punishing Monzel.  While she may not choose to be in court for the 
Damages Hearing, a good lawyer will have emphasized to her the assertive, 
proactive nature of her involvement.  At best, this will give Amy a positive, self-
affirming psychological experience; at worst, it is no worse than the current 
                                                                                                     
 251. Monzel was a former nurse at the time of his sentencing.  Mike Scarcella, D.C. Circuit Orders 
Hearing in Child Pornography Victim’s Restitution Dispute, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGALTIMES 
(April 19, 2011), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/04/dc-circuit-child-pornography-victim-owed-
more-restitution.html.  Although he will probably not be allowed to return to nursing, he may be able to 
use his specialized medical knowledge to obtain medical clerical work.  Thus, $30,000 per year, if 
optimistic, is at least possible. 
 252. $30,000 per year divided in half is $15,000, times ten years of probation is $150,000. 
 253. One year for each 1% of restitution quotient, with a 50% quotient, yields fifty years of 
reduction.  This high reduction value results from the very high amount of Amy’s damages compared to 
Monzel’s projected post-release income.  Regrettably, this is probably a common scenario. 
 254. See supra note 232 (noting that this reduction limit is different than a mandatory minimum 
sentence). 
 255. The guideline reduced Monzel’s sentence by eight years, from ten to two.  However, the 
probation period is untouched by the guideline reduction. 
 256. See supra Section V.B.4 (describing the relationship between the reduction in prison sentence 
and the length of supervised release). 
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system.257 
From the State’s perspective, this outcome fulfills the criminal law’s purposes 
of socialized revenge, restraint, and making the victim whole.258  It may also 
provide effective general deterrence, as Monzel’s long term punishment of 
payment may be more visible to his peers than if he were locked away in prison.  
The burden on the State of incarcerating Monzel is reduced from ten years to two.  
Finally, the prosecutor is relieved of the burden of investigating and proving Amy’s 
damages.   
Monzel himself, meanwhile, has received less time in prison.259  During the 
period of his supervised release, he will have both a strong incentive and assistance 
to find and keep work; he will also have complementary mental health assistance.  
Maine’s experience with mental health and drug courts suggests that this will 
substantially reduce the chances that Monzel will commit other crimes.260 
D.  Limitations and Possible Drawbacks of the Proposed Changes 
While the proposed § 1174-B would improve the functioning of criminal 
sentencing in many ways, it does have possible drawbacks compared to Maine’s 
current procedure, the French partie civile system, and this journal’s 1974 proposal.  
The proposed adjustments to the current procedure are highly limited in 
comparison to the latter two systems. 
First, as against Maine’s current procedure, the proposed procedure would 
remove some discretion from the prosecutor.  A prosecutor who did not believe 
restitution to be an appropriate element of punishment would not be able to prevent 
the victim from asking for it and presenting complete evidence and witnesses 
related to his damages.  Furthermore, the guideline reduction in the offender’s 
prison term would also remove some discretion from both the prosecutor and the 
judge.  Although the guideline reduction, like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
would not be binding on the judge, the widely-scoped “reasonableness” standard of 
review means that judges may be wary of invoking their discretion to vary.  
Finally, the process of discovery as to the victim’s damages, and the addition of a 
Damages Hearing before sentencing, would add somewhat to the overall length and 
burden of the criminal proceeding. 
The exact cost to the State, compared with current practice, is difficult to 
predict.  It would undoubtedly require significant extra funding for Probation 
Services.  The program should, over time, shift the allocation of financial resources 
from the prison system to the probation system, as convicts spend less time in 
prison and more time being monitored and assisted by probation officers—or by 
the staff of independent non-profit agencies.  The work assistance and mental 
                                                                                                     
 257. Results may vary. 
 258. See supra Section II (placing restitution in context among other purpose of the criminal law). 
 259. Appropriately economizing incarceration time is one of the purposes of Maine’s criminal law.  
See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151 (2006 & Supp. 2011) (“The general purposes of [sentencing include] . . . to 
minimize correctional experiences which serve to produce further criminality.”) 
 260. See Cummings, supra note 187 (describing the economic and penological benefits of mental 
health courts). 
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health programs for probationers would certainly incur costs, though evidence 
suggests that these costs would be less than the costs of long-term incarceration for 
repeat offenders.261  The true measure of success for the program, however, would 
be whether recidivism rates decline, overall state expenditures on corrections 
decline, and victim satisfaction with the criminal justice system increases. 
Next, as compared with the French partie civile system, the proposed changes 
would provide comparatively less agency to the crime victim and fewer procedural 
guarantees.  The victim would remain without the ability to proactively initiate 
prosecution, for instance.262  Likewise, unless called as a witness, the victim may 
not participate in the process of adjudicating guilt or innocence, as he may in 
France.263  Although the victim would have the right, following an acquittal, to 
initiate a separate civil action against the acquitted defendant,264 the victim would 
not be able to seek civil damages against the acquitted defendant in the same 
criminal proceeding, as he may in France.265  
Finally, unlike the procedure this journal proposed in 1974, there would be no 
right in the victim to be a full party to the prosecution.266  The victim would not sit 
with the state’s attorney at counsel table, nor even be guaranteed access to the 
courtroom prior to the verdict.  He would have no additional procedural rights 
during the adjudication of guilt or innocence.  In this sense, the proposed changes 
hew more closely to Maine’s current system than to the simplified partie civile 
system envisioned in 1974. 
Even with these limitations and drawbacks, the proposed statute is still worth 
implementing.  The impingement on prosecutorial and judicial discretion is 
minimal, and the proposal mirrors changes already in place at the federal level and 
                                                                                                     
 261. See Steeves, supra note 186 (documenting the high cost of recidivism); see also Ray Price, Jr., 
The Impact of Drug Courts on Incarceration, 2011 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 37, 37-40 (collecting 
and discussing recent data as to the rise in incarceration rates and the attendant costs, and documenting a 
correlation between participation in a drug court and markedly lower rates of recidivism). 
 262. Compare supra Section V.B (recommending adjustments to Maine’s Victim’s Rights Statutes 
without any right in the victim to initiate prosecution) with supra note 116 (noting that in France a 
victim may initiate a State investigation and prosecution).  See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(3) (Supp. 
2012) (providing a right in the victim to compel a federal court to vindicate his rights as a crime victim). 
 263. Compare supra Section V.B (recommending no right in the victim to participate in adjudication 
of guilt or innocence) with supra Section III.C (noting a broad range of procedural participation by the 
victim in a French criminal proceeding). 
 264. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1327 (2006) (recognizing the right of a victim to seek civil damages 
separately from the criminal proceeding); see also, e.g., Rufo v. Simpson, 86 Cal. App. 4th 573 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001) (upholding a California civil wrongful death judgment of $33,500,000 against football and 
television star O.J. Simpson following his acquittal on criminal charges stemming from the murders of 
his ex-wife and her boyfriend). 
 265. Compare supra Section V.B (recommending no right in the victim to seek damages after the 
acquittal of the defendant) with supra note 123 (noting that in France a victim may seek civil damages 
after the acquittal of the defendant). 
 266. Compare supra Section V.B (recommending no changes to the phases of the criminal trial 
occurring before the verdict) with Compensating Victims, supra note 134, at 146 (“The victim would be 
considered in all respects a party to the prosecution – from sitting with the state’s attorney at counsel 
table to assisting the prosecutor in the preparation of the case where appropriate.”) 
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in about half of the states.267  It is true, and a valid criticism, that an additional post-
verdict hearing in the criminal trial, preceded by something like civil discovery, 
will lengthen the sentencing phase.  However, the actual weight of this burden 
should be within the capacity of the system.  Unlike damages evidence in more 
complex civil litigation, evidence of direct economic harm to crime victims—
doctors’ bills, valuation of destroyed property, lost wages—should be 
comparatively simple to collect. 
It is also true that the current proposal is more limited than this journal’s 1974 
proposal, and significantly more limited than the full partie civile system 
implemented in France.  This should not stop Maine from taking steps in the right 
direction.  Some further progress toward restoring and empowering victims of 
crime, even if not as far-reaching as it could be, would be an improvement over the 
current system.  As Maine gains experience with recalibrating its criminal justice 
system away from incarceration and toward victim restitution, the state will 
undoubtedly need to make further changes. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Restitution is one element of criminal sentencing, but it is an element that 
could be highly effective at meeting the stated goals of criminal law in Maine.  
Compared to U.S. federal law and to French law, Maine’s provisions for victims’ 
rights in the criminal process and for the use of restitution are both relatively 
limited.  Rather than provide victims a proactive, engaged role, the criminal 
process marginalizes victims, further exacerbating the damage done by the crime.  
Maine could improve its treatment of both victims and offenders by using more 
restitution and less jail time.  Furthermore, Maine could adopt a “Damages 
Hearing” procedural window in which the victim would present evidence of his 
economic damages to the sentencing court.  Additional monitoring of and 
assistance to probationers can increase the chances that the restitution order is not a 
false hope to the victim, but rather a promise that one day he will be made whole.  
All of these steps would create a more positive psychological experience for the 
victim and potentially relieve economic pressure on Maine’s criminal justice 
system. 
                                                                                                     
 267. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (2000 & Supp. 2012) (establishing mandatory restitution for certain 
federal crimes); supra note 138 (“In . . . roughly half of the states, judges are either mandated to order 
restitution or told that restitution must be ordered unless they find a special reason not to do so.”) 
